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PREFACE
In this author's earlier review of Executive Order 11,246,1 published
in February, 1971, it was predicted that 1971 would be the year in
which affirmative action would achieve the awe and the respect of the
legal profession. Among the reasons then given for the profession's
expanding awareness were the following: (1) the far greater circulation
of equal opportunity certification forms among government contractors
and subcontractors; (2) the growing tendency of federal, state and local
civil rights enforcement agencies to use affirmative action criteria in
adjudicating issues of discrimination; (3) the federal government's
readiness to use stop orders in the construction industry; (4) and per-
haps most significant, the serious challenges of affirmative action to the
Congressionally mandated national labor policy. Since February, 1971,
construction industry affirmative action plans have survived concen-
trated attacks in two landmark cases: Contractors Association of Eastern
Pennysylvania v. Sec. of Labor2 and Southern Illinois Builders Associa-
tion v. Ogilvie.3
In these cases the courts have resolved some of the conflicts and
apparent irreconcilabilities noted in the earlier article in favor of the
1. 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Exec.
Order No. 11,246].
2. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
3. 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
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Executive Order.4 For the employer's counsel, accustomed to union
power, the warning is that his client must now accommodate two
formidable systems, the national labor policy and affirmative action.
For the trade union counsel, the warning is that affirmative action
threatens a period of insecurity during which many bulwarks will fall.
National labor policy for purposes of this article means the court-
formulated doctrine that the National Labor Relations Act,5 as
amended, requires the subjection to collective bargaining of a vast
number of decisional processes at one time considered within the
domain of management, Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N. L.
R. B.;6Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co.; 7 United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.8 While the national labor policy
does not give unions exclusive control of matters subject to collective
bargaining, the rules of the game, as grounded in legislation, rulings of
the National Labor Relations Board and decisions of the federal and
state courts give unions an immense probability of achieving their aims.
It is the thesis of this article that in the face of the civil rights onslaught
some of the doctrinal strongholds are crumbling.
Beyond the ambit of this article are actions in the federal courts
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,9 in which the Justice
Department or individual minority complainants have successfully
shaken seniority systems, 10 hiring halls" and methods of internal union
management. 12 In the widely publicized case of United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp.,'5 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vastly broadened
the District Court's remedial order.' 4 That order had evolved from
findings that the seniority and transfer provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement perpetuated the effects of years of discrimination.
On authority of Title VII the Second Circuit ordered a suspension of
the fragmented seniority system of departments and units. It also
ordered that each minority discriminatee be granted the right to make
4. For an extended discussion of these and other related cases see pp. 22-28 infra.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
6. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
7. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
8. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
9. §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964) [hereinafter cited at Title VII].
10. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 US. 424 (1971).
11. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
12. United States v. International Longshoremen's Association, 319 F. Supp. 737 (D.
Md. 1970).
13. No. 35183 (2d Cir., June 21, 1971).
14. 312 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. N.Y. 1970).
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one move to a job within his qualifications in a different unit or depart-
ment with a guarantee of pay not less than that in his former job.
It is submitted that unions and their attorneys are less sensitive to the
inroads of affirmative action on the national labor policy than they are
to the inroads of Title VII suits. Yet, for reasons developed in this
article, when affirmative action in involved, the government's crunch is
speedier, more pervasive and harder for a union to defend against.15
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ExEcTrrnvE OU)ER
Executive Order 11,246, the central pier of affirmative action
programs, was signed on September 24, 1965. This article does not
consider Part I, dealing with non-discrimination in government em-
ployment. Its treatment is strictly limited to Part II, dealing with
non-discrimination in employment by government contractors and
subcontractors, and Part III, dealing with non-discrimination provi-
sions in federally-assisted construction contracts.
Part II consists of Sections 201 through 215.16 Section 201 lodges
administrative responsibility in the Secretary of Labor. 17 Section 20218
contains the Equal Opportunity Clause to be reproduced in all
contracts between government contracting agencies and government
contractors. Section 20319 deals with compliance reports by contrac-
tors, subcontractors and unions. Section 20420 empowers the Secretary
of Labor to grant certain exemptions.
In Sections 205 through 20821 are provisions dealing with the follow-
ing: (1) coordination between the Secretary of Labor and the various
government contracting agencies; (2) investigations by the Secretary
of Labor on his own initiative or on complaints by employees or pros-
pective employees of a government contractor or subcontractor; (3)
the inclusion of labor unions in the implementation of the Order;
and (4) the holding of hearings.
Sections 209 through 21222 contain the sanctions and penalties.
15. For a discussion of the impact of administration and enforcement as applicable to
unions, see p. 45 infra.
16. Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§ 201-215, 3 C.F.R. 402-407 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000c
(Supp. V, 1970).
17. Id. at 402.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 403.
20. Id. at 404.
21. Id. at 404-405.
22. Id. at 406-407.
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From the standpoint of the company dependent on government con-
tracts or subcontracts, the penalty of cancellation, termination, or
suspension is perhaps the most significant. In addition, the Secretary
of Labor may debar a contractor or subcontractor from any govern-
ment work until the contractor or subcontractor satisfies the Secretary
that he will "carry out personnel and employment policies in compli-
ance with the provisions of this Order."28
Part 11124 deals with federally-assisted construction contracts; estab-
lishing a regulatory pattern in which parties receiving federal construc-
tion aid (called "applicants") 25 are responsible for compliance with
Equal Employment Opportunity by contractors and subcontractors
on the construction projects.
The question of coverage is recurrently touched on in this article.
Suffice it to say at this point that the rules for determining exemption,
the definition of subcontract and the definition of subcontractor appear
not in the Executive Order but in the Regulations of the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance. 26 In brief, the reach of Part 1127 of the
Executive Order is to persons who hold contracts with an agency of
the federal government and their subcontractors at any tier. The reach
of Part 11128 is to persons who contract with applicants for federal
construction assistance and their subcontractors. The federal assistance
programs subject to Part III are, under the phraseology of Section
301,29 programs entailing assistance in any contract for the construc-
tion, rehabilitation, alteration, conversion, extension, or repair of
buildings, highways, or other improvements to real property.
The Executive Order as originally issued condemned discrimination
in race, color, religion and national origin. Amendatory Executive
Order 11375,30 signed October 13, 1967, and effective October 13, 1968,
added sex.
Executive Order No. 11,246 transferred compliance supervision from
the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity to the
23. Id. at 406.
24. Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§ 301-304, 3 C.F.R. 407-409 (1970), 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Supp.
V, 1970).
25. Id. at 408.
26. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.3 (1970).
27. Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§ 201-215, 3 C.F.R. 402-407 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp.
V, 1970).
28. Id. at 407.
29. Id.
30. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967).
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Secretary of Labor. Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz created the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance' in 1965,32 and in 1968 transferred
all of his authority to it.83
The awakening of an employer normally results from repeated
receipt of the certification forms34 (required by the OFCC regulations
under the Executive Order) furnished by the employer's customers
who are government contractors or subcontractors. When an employer
asks for advice concerning the new trend, his counsel should at a mini-
mum point out the following outstanding features of affirmative action:
1. A need for newly directed hiring methods, called by some, "pre-
ferential hiring" or "compensatory hiring."33
2. Treatment by the United States Government of women as well
as Negroes, Orientals, American Indians and Spanish surnamed
Americans as beneficiaries of affirmative action.36
3. A new stature for quotas.3 7
4. The requirement that employers attempt to influence the affir-
mative action performance of their subcontractors.3 "
5. The power of government to disqualify some employers for gov-
ernment contract work.39
6. The requirement that some employers find ways of circumvent-
ing certain entrenched union protective systems, such as seniority
and bidding.40
7. The opening of an entirely new appeals framework for aggrieved
employees and non-employee opponents of the employer. 41
II. THE QUANDARY OF THE SUBCONTRACTOR
A. Source of Definitions and Exemptions
General responsibility for the Executive Order is lodged in OFCC.
In its Regulations § 60-1,42 effective October 24, 1965, and last amended
31. Hereinafter identified as OFCC.
32. 31 Fed. Reg. 6921 (1966).
33. Secretary's Order No. 15-68 (August 8, 1968).
34. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (1970).
35. See discussion pp. 14-22, 26-27, 36-38 infra.
36. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.1 (1970) and note 92, infra.
37. See discussion pp. 25-26 infra.
38. See discussion pp. 6-11 infra.
39. See discussion pp. 41-47 infra.
40. See discussion pp. 29-33 infra.
41. See discussion pp. 43-44 infra.
42. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1 (1970).
Vol. 10: 1, 1971
National Labor Policy
July 1, 1970, OFCC has promulgated the standards and procedures for
implementation. In addition most federal departments have contract
compliance sections, charged with insuring that affirmative action
programs are maintained by contractors and subcontractors whose
work is awarded or regulated by that department.4 3 Control entails
conducting pre-award compliance reviews when contracts exceed
$1,000,00044 maintaining standing lists of approved and ineligible
contractors and subcontractors, 45 investigating contractors and sub-
contractors during the course of contract performance 46 acting on
complaints, 47 issuing stop-orders 48 and coordinating with other agen-
cies. 49
The regulatory scheme reaches a subcontractor at any tier.50 From
the standpoint of the employer who inquires about coverage, there are
two important criteria. The first is that the work, whether performed
by a prime contractor or subcontractor, must be in furtherance of a
government contract or a federally-assisted construction contract.51
Secondly, the contract, whether held by a prime contractor or sub-
contractor at any tier must be worth $10,000 or more.52 The following
definition of subcontract indicates broad regulatory scope:
The term "subcontract" means any agreement or arrangement
between a contractor and any person (in which the parties do not
stand in the relationship of an employer and an employee):
(1) For the furnishing of supplies or services or for the use of
real or personal property, including lease arrangements, which,
in whole or in part, is necessary to the performance of any one
or more contracts; or
(2) Under which any portion of the contractor's obligation un-
der any one or more contracts is performed, undertaken or as-
sumed.53
In § 60-1.5 there appears the exemption for contracts and subcon-
tracts not exceeding $10,000. 54 This provision continues that: "No
43. Id. § 60-1.6(b).
44. Id. § 60-1.20(d).
45. Id. §'60-1.30.
46. Id. § 60-1.20(a).
47. Id. § 60-1.24.
48. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209, 3 C.F.R. 406 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
49. Id.
50. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.3(x) (1970).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 60-1.5(a).
53. Id. § 60-1.3(w).
54. Id. § 60.1-5(a)(1).
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agency, contractor, or sub-contractor shall procure supplies or services
in less than usual quantities to avoid applicability of the equal oppor-
tunity clause." 55 With respect to contracts and subcontracts for in-
definite quantities, the section further provides that a purchaser shall
require compliance by a supplier unless the purchaser has reason to
believe that the amount to be ordered in any year will not exceed
$10,000.50
The Regulation in § 60-1.4057 fixes a second jurisdictional demarca-
tion of $50,000 and 50 employees. The requirement of instituting and
maintaining a satisfactory written affirmative action program applies
only to a contractor or subcontractor who has at least one contract in
furtherance of government work worth $50,000 or more and which
employs at least 50 persons. For employers with contracts in the inter-
mediate range between $10,000 and $50,000 there is relief from the
necessity of having a written plan. But such employers are still gov-
erned by the seven paragraphs of the Equal Opportunity Clause.58
Among the requirements which apply to companies with contracts
above $10,000, are providing compliance reviews, assuring compliance
by subcontractors, informing labor organizations of the company's
policy towards affirmative action, and maintaining an affirmative action
posture.59
B. Jurisdictional Obscurity
The actual perimeter of jurisdiction is a matter of real confusion.
Some corporations with annual sales in excess of $10,000,000 a year
claim they are exempt. Some small fabricating shops have acknowledged
coverage and are trying to comply. If an employer holds the prime
contract to construct a $1,000,000 post office and engages a brickmason
subcontractor who performs brick work on the site for a fee of $100,000,
both the prime contractor and the brickmason are obviously covered.
The status of the brickmason's supplier perhaps illustrates the
quandary of thousands of employers. This supplier replenishes the
mason's stock as purchase orders are received. The supplier is one of
a half dozen brick yards which add products to that inventory. When
55. Id.
56. Id. § 60-1.5(a)(2).
57. Id. § 60-1.40(a).
58. Id. § 60-1.4.
59. Id.
Vol. 10: 1, 1971
Nationai Labor Policy
purchase orders are placed, there is no way of estimating which bricks
will go into the post office or into any other government edifices on
which the mason works. It is entirely conceivable that all bricks in a
single order worth more than $10,000 will go into the post office. It is
also conceivable that the mason will use this supplier's bricks exclu-
sively for civilian work or that bricks covered by any order and devoted
to government work will represent less than $10,000 of that order.
The mason would like to treat his supplier as subject to the regula-
tions in order to obtain the signed Equal Opportunity Clause from
the supplier. The mason anticipates that an investigator in the con-
tracts compliance section of the Post Office Department will, after
examining the prime contractor's records, check the mason and expect
an explanation of any of the mason's supply contracts not accompanied
by the federal certification. The supplier, on the other hand, wants to
be exempt because his work force consists of three brothers, a son,
his wife's uncle and two cousins and because he abhors interference
by bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the supplier knows that if he does not
sign the clause his favored customer will take the line of least resistance
and hand his share of the trade to competitors.
An even more baffling illustration is that of the builders' supply
house which furnishes hi-lifts, ladders, buckets, protective clothing
and other equipment to the mason. Although none of these items are
called for by the contract between the mason and the government and
although they will contribute to the mason's civilian as well as govern-
ment work, they are clearly indispensable to the mason's operations
and, therefore, to his fulfillment of any contract. Since the definition
of subcontract quoted in the preceding subchapter mentions the fur-
nishing of supplies "necessary to the performance of any one or more
[government] contracts," some cautious attorneys are advising their
business clients that even a thin connection between the supplies and
the performance of the government work satisfies the functional test
of coverage. Although there are no known case-law precedents on this
issue, the author submits that this interpretation disregards the funda-
mental principle that the prime contract fixes jurisdiction. When the
prime contractor elects to subdivide the prime contract, each of the
pieces is covered as a functional unit within the perimeters of the
covered prime contract. A supply contract for facilities and equipment
not mentioned in the prime contract is not one of those pieces. The
point is illustrated by a perhaps absurd hypothetical set of facts. If a
Duquesne Law Review
company holds a government prime contract in the amount of $9,000,
that contract is exempt and cannot by itself be the basis of coverage.
If in order to tool up for the contract and for anticipated civilian work
the company in its own shop prepares patterns, dyes, pallets and other
equipment with a cost on the company's books of $10,000, the prime
contract does not thereby become a $19,000 contract, $9,000 above
the coverage minimum. If, as more frequently happens, the company
procures these items from a subcontractor for a purchase price of
$10,000, the company does not thereby create a subject of regulation
when the prime contract is itself exempt. To misconstrue the term
"necessary" in the definition of subcontract is to overlook the unity
of the prime contract and to permit a collection of parts, in the form
of subcontracts, to exceed the whole.
C. The Pervasiveness of the System
At this time there are no known precedents establishing presump-
tions regarding exemption or non-exemption. However, certain con-
stants are known. One is that the $10,000 test is fulfilled when there
is one $10,000 contract in any year or when there is an open-end buying
arrangement in which orders exceed $10,000 in any year.6 0 Another is
that the term subcontract has a broad meaning, embracing the furnish-
ing of services, the supplying of products and the supplying of raw
materials. 61 Still another constant is that in most disputes about cover-
age federal administrators take the most expansive view possible. 62
What remains unresolved is the availability of the exemption to sub-
contractors whose goods and services contribute generally to the opera-
tions of another subcontractor or prime contractor but cannot be traced
directly to any government order.
The machinery established by OFCC and the contracting agencies
for administering the Executive Order perhaps prevents many exempt
employers from taking advantage of the exemption.6 The regulations
require that each prime contractor have on record two important com-
mitment documents from each first-tier subcontractor who contributes
60. Id. § 60-1.5(a)(1).
61. Id. § 60-1.3(w).
62. Interviews with federal administrators.
63. One estimate of coverage is that about one-third of the American labor force is
employed by companies which hold some government contracts. UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 133 (1970).
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to the prime contractor's performance through a subcontract worth
$10,000 or more. The first is a signed certification that the subcon-
tractor does not maintain segregated facilities and that the subcontrac-
tor complies with the seven clauses comprising the Equal Opportunity
Clause.64 The second is a purchase order addressed to the particular
subcontractor in which the seven paragraphs of the Equal Opportunity
Clause are designated as terms of the subcontract. 5 If the prime con-
tractor lacks such substantiation in the case of some subcontractors and
is unable to convince the government that those subcontracts are
exempt, the prime contractor faces the penalty of a stop-order, possible
blacklisting and possible inability to bid on later projects.66 From the
standpoint of the prime contractor it is easier to maintain a complete
file than to defend exceptions.
Paragraph 7 of the Equal Opportunity Clause, embodied in the
certification signed by the first-tier subcontractor and included as a
term of the purchase order, requires the first-tier subcontractor to in-
clude the clause in his subcontracts.6 7 Again, the test of coverage is
work in furtherance of the government order and a price of $10,000
or more.68 The rippling effect continues to the second-tier subcontrac-
tor and subcontractors at successive tiers.
Today, purchasing departments of many large businesses automati-
cally furnish the certification forms on an annual basis to all regular
subcontractors and to prospective subcontractors. The subcontractor
who claims an exemption or who ignores the form faces the risk of
being classified as ineligible. Similarly, the Equal Opportunity Clause
is often included as standard in all purchase orders of certain com-
panies. As a practical matter these companies cannot, at the time of
buying, draw the fine distinctions necessary to determine whether or
not the clause is needed in a given purchase order.
III. THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CLAUSE
In order to lay down a compliance network the government has
prescribed two important documents. The first is the certification form
64. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.8(b) (1970).
65. Id. §§ 60-1.4(a)(7), (b)(7), (c).
66. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209, 3 C.F.R. 406 (1970), 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
67. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.4(a)(7), (b)(7) (1970).
68. Id. §§ 60-1.3(p, 1.5(a).
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which contractors and subcontractors subject to the Executive Order
send to their known and prospective subcontractors on an annual or
other periodic basis.69 This document contains the certification as to
non-segregated facilities and the Equal Opportunity Clause. The sec-
ond documentary control is provided through the inclusion in actual
purchase orders of the Equal Opportunity Clause. 70 When the purchase
order is for an amount less than $50,000, the Regulations approve in-
corporation by reference. 71
The certification as to non-segregated facilities deals with locker
rooms, drinking fountains, rest rooms, places of work, and, generally,
with physical attributes. 72 Since women are now beneficiaries of affir-
mative action, there will be some delicate questions about physical
facilities.
It is in certain sections of the Equal Opportunity Clause, embodied
in both the pre-transaction certification and the eventual purchase
order, that the signer makes the pledge to affirmative action. Unfor-
tunately, the obligatory language is camouflaged by technical phrase-
ology and by blanket references to the Executive Order.
Paragraph 173 of the seven is a pledge to avoid discrimination in
any facets of employment (in addition to the physical facilities previ-
ously discussed) and, most importantly, to adopt a policy of affirmative
action in employment.
In paragraph 274 the employer agrees to include the language "An
Equal Opportunity Employer" in advertisements for help. This re-
quirement has not proven troublesome.
In paragraph 375 the employer agrees to notify the union of its equal
opportunity undertaking.
In paragraph 476 the employer agrees to obey the Executive Order
11,246 and all regulations issued thereunder. Employers would take the
certification more seriously if the government had added the following
words: "which Executive Order may require preferential hiring,77
negation of some clauses of your union agreement, 78 lessening of ability
69. Id. § 60-1.8(b).
70. Id. §§ 60-1.4(a)(7), (b)(7).
71. Id. § 60-1.4(d).
72. Id. § 60-1.8.
73. Id. §§ 60-1.4(a)(1), (b)(1).
74. Id. §§ 60-1.4(a)(2), (b)(2).
75. Id. §§ 60-1.4(a)(3), (b)(3).
76. Id. §§ 60-1.4(a)(4), (b)(4).
77. See discussion pp. 14-22, 26-27, 36-38 infra.
78. See discussion pp. 42-43 infra.
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as a factor in promotions,7 9 and the incorporation of women in all
levels of your work force."8' 0
Paragraph 581 deals with the filing of Equal Opportunity Commis-
sion Form EEO-18 2 and with inspection of the employer's records.
In paragraph 683 the employer acknowledges that in the event of
his non-compliance with any rules, regulations or orders of OFCC,
the government may cancel, terminate or suspend the contract in whole
or in part and may declare the employer ineligible for further govern-
ment contracts.
Paragraph 784 contains the promise to include the Equal Oppor-
tunity Clause in purchase orders when the transaction is non-exempt.
In the writer's experience, most employers who deal with the Equal
Opportunity Clause do not recognize the implications of paragraph 7.
They are unaware that conditions may require them to cease dealing
with a long-standing, faithful supplier, who lacks the wherewithal to
institute affirmative action or who claims exemption.
IV. THE FABRIC OF AFFIRMATIVE AcTION-MANUFACTURING
AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES
The OFCC Regulations in § 60-1.4085 impose on contractors and
subcontractors with a government contract exceeding $50,000 and with
50 or more employees a requirement of developing and maintaining a
written affirmative action compliance program.
For immediate immersion in the concepts of the OFCC, the writer
recommends a reading of the OFCC Guidelines dated January 30,
1970, embodied in Regulation Part 60-286 entitled "Affirmative Action
Guidelines." An affirmative action program is defined to be "a set
of specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor com-
mits himself to apply every good faith effort."8' 7 The Guidelines are
known as "Order No. 4."88
This chapter deals with employers outside the construction industry.
79. See discussion pp. 38-39 infra.
80. See discussion pp. 14-15 infra.
81. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.4(a)(5), (b)(5) (1970).
82. For a discussion of Form EEO-1, see note 92, infra.
83. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.4(a)(6), (b)(6) (1970).
84. Id. §§ 60-1.4(a)(7), (b)(7).
85. Id. § 60-1.40.
86 Id. § 60-2 (Hereinafter cited as Order No. 4].
87. Id. § 60-2.10.
88. Hereinafter referred to as Order No. 4.
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Such employers are to take the initiative in formulating their own
affirmative action programs, subject to inspection by compliance officers
during compliance reviews. For employers in the construction industry,
(considered in the following chapter) the standards are those nego-
tiated in a "hometown solution" or those dictated by the federal gov-
ernment because of the inability of industrial, trade union and civil
rights representatives to mold a satisfactory "hometown solution."
A. Category Deficiencies
Essential to an understanding of Order No. 4, as it applies to both
the construction and non-construction field, is the concept of a category
deficiency.89 In the manufacturing and service industries, employers
are encouraged to detect their own category deficiencies. In their writ-
ten affirmative action programs, the prologue is to set forth an analysis
of employment categories, including middle and upper management,
and to label as deficient those categories in which minority group rep-
resentation is less than in some base such as the population of the
local municipality.90 Choice of the base is usually a matter of negotia-
tion with compliance officers, local civil rights spokesmen, the union
and such local governmental officials as may get involved. Section
60-2.1111 states the following factors will influence the determination
of the base: the minority population of the labor area surrounding
the facility; the size of the minority unemployment force in that area;
the percentage of minority work force as compared with the total
work force in the immediate labor area; the general availability of
minorities having requisite skills in an area in which the contractor
can reasonably recruit; the availability of promotable minority em-
ployees within the contractor's organization; the anticipated expan-
sion, contraction and turnover of and in the work force; the existence
of training institutions capable of training minorities in the requisite
skills; and the degree of training which the contractor is reasonably
able to undertake as a means of making all job classes available to
minorities.
Since OFCC now recognizes four traditional minority groups and
also classifies women as a group to which affirmative action applies,92
89. See Order No. 4 § 60-2.11.
90. Id § 60-2.11(a).
91. Id.
92. Classifications on Standard Form 100 (EEO-l) promulgated jointly by OFCC and
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what are the chances that any major employer in this century will be
free of deficiency categories? Will a time come when certain now
incipient movements, such as the drive to protect civil rights of Italo-
Americans9" and to gain equal justice for homosexuals" catch the
attention of OFCC?
It is known that an employer's responsibility to correct a deficiency
category is in no way lessened by such practical considerations as a
traditional disinterest of a minority toward work in that category,95
the employer's rigorous profession of a non-discriminatory intent,90
the aversion of the union to changing conditions in that category, 97 or
the existence of adequate minority group ratios in other categories. 98
Satisfactory ratios throughout 24 departments do not excuse a defi-
ciency in the 25th, which might be sales or engineering. Any analysis
must take account of the distribution of women. 9
B. Rectifying Deficiencies
For any employer with a contract or subcontract worth more than
$50,000 and with 50 or more persons in the organization, the existence
of a deficiency requires remedial action. 00 Specifically that employer
must set target dates for progressive correction of the deficiency. 10'
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are Male, Female, Negro, Oriental,
American Indian and Spanish surnamed American. Annual filing of the form is an
obligation of government contractors and subcontractors under the OFCC regulations as
well as under Title VII. 42 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a)(1) (1970). In compliance reviews and pre-
award investigations under the Executive Order the forms are an important vehicle of the
compliance investigator; investigators sometimes require mid-year updatings. 41 C.F.R.§§ 60-1.7(a)(2), (b) (1970).
93. The attempted slaying of Joseph Columbo, prime mover of the Italian-American
Civil Rights League, during a Unity Day Rally, raises interesting prospects of inter-
minority competition. What D'Ya Hear From the Mob? NEwswEEx, July 12, 1971, at 31.
94. See McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970).
95. Order No. 4 establishes career counselling of employees as one responsibility of the
government contractor's equal opportunity executive. Order No. 4 §§ 60-2.22(b)(6),
2_25(f)(6).
96. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 425 (1971), the Supreme Court declared
that good intent or absence of discriminatory intent is less significant than the con-
sequences of employment practices.
97. In the Bid Conditions promulgated by the Labor Department for federal and
federally-assisted construction contracts in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania there appears
the following warning: "It shall be no excuse that the union with which the contractor
has a collective bargaining agreement providing for exclusive referral failed to refer
minority employees." Bid Conditions Paragraph 0. See note 132, infra.
98. Order No. 4 § 60-2.11(d).
99. OFCC has issued Sex Discrimination Guidelines, which inter alia, require affirma-
tive action to recruit women to apply for those jobs where they have been previously
excluded. 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.6(a) (1970).
100. Id. § 60-1.40 (1970).
101. Order No. 4 § 60-2.11(b).
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These target dates must appear in the written affirmative action pro-
gram.102
The government does not settle for unsubstantiated pledges. As part
of the affirmative action program the employer must indicate how
he expects to rebuild the categories involved. 103 Specific measures
referred to in governmental directives are advertising in minority
group media, 104 notification to welfare agencies and minority group
manpower sources 0 5 and closer coordination with unemployment com-
pensation authorities. 06 The perceptive employer will realize that
during the rebuilding period he will have to shift away from conven-
tional recruiting methods, such as use of known employment agencies,
canvassing of existing workers and advertising in media of broad
circulation. There is no known prohibition on measures which ex-
tinguish or reduce exposure to prospective employees possessing tradi-
tional characteristics.
The deficiency may be in a category for which experience is a
necessary qualification. If the employer has traditionally promoted
from within, he may have to break away from this policy, even at the
risk of antagonizing a union or breaching a union contract. If he al-
ready has some minority group workers in his regular force, he may
have to give them preferential promotional opportunities. His affirma-
tive action plan may show how minority group workers, once hired,
will have especial opportunities to learn the better-paying jobs in
order that they may bypass employees of more seniority.107 In the
writer's experience unions have not been tolerant towards these
changes.
A few other employer actions required or recommended by Order
No. 4 are giving active support of local and national community action
programs; 08 publicizing the employer's commitment in the company
newspaper, annual report and other media; 09 indoctrinating super-
visory personnel; 1 0 seeking the cooperation of union officials;"' pic-
turing both minority and non-minority employees when employees are
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. § 60-2.25(e)(10).
105. Id. § 60-2.25(e)(2).
106. Id. § 60-2.25(e)(1).
107. Id. § 60-2.25().
108. Id. § 60-2.27.
109. Id. § 60-2.21(a)(2).
110. Id. § 60-2.22(b)(4).
111. Id. § 60-2.21(a)(6).
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featured in product of consumer advertising;112 informing recruiting
sources of the policy;'118 incorporating the Equal Opportunity Clause
in purchase orders subject to Executive Order 11,246;114 notifying
minority organizations, community agencies and colleges of the pol-
icy;' 15 seeking appropriate action by subcontractors; 16 appointing one
executive as director of company Equal Opportunity programs;11 7 and
assuring that minority employees are afforded a full opportunity to
participate in all company-sponsored educational, training, recreational
and social activities. 118
V. THE FABmc OF AFFIRMATIVE AcTION-CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
A. Disenchantment with the "Hometown Solution"
It is in the construction industry that affirmative action has come
of age. In this sector the exposure of the unions, as well as of em-
ployers, to demands for reform is especially intense. Typically unions
influence hirings and recalls through hiring halls, regulate apprentice
programs and fix standards for employment.
Contrary to the OFCC policies for the manufacturing and service
industries, the construction industry employers and unions do not
stipulate deficiencies and goals. These are dictated by a community
plan, such as those negotiated in Indianapolis" 9 and Boston, 120 or by
governmentally promulgated bid conditions such as those now in effect
in Pittsburgh and discussed in this chapter.1 21 It was such area stan-
dards which were sustained as valid in Eastern Contractors and Southern
Illinois Builders.
In the evolution which occurred in various metropolitan areas dur-
ing the late 1960's and early 1970's, there has been a drift away from
the so-called "hometown solution." At the outset local civil rights
groups caused negotiations to begin, in which the participants were
112. Id. §§ 60-2.21(a)(10), (b)(4).
113. Id. § 60-2.21(b)(1).
114. Id. § 60-2.21(b)(2).
115. Id. § 60-2.21(b)(3).
116. Id. § 60-2.21(b)(5).
117. Id. § 60-2.22(a).
118. Id. § 60-2.22(b)(7)(iii).
119. A summary of the Indianapolis Plan appears in 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC.
GumE 5064 (1970).
120. A commentary on the Boston and Denver Plans appears in 1 CCH EmPL. PRAc.
GuE 5078 (1970).
121. See pp. 18-22 infra.
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normally civil rights leaders, construction industry employer associa-
tions, craft unions and local government officials. If the talks became
sluggish or if the civil rights activists became impatient with the con-
cessions of the industry and union representatives, pressure was exerted
by denunciations in the media, street demonstrations and appeals to the
federal contracting office which was distributing funds in the area. 22
When faced with such pleas, the government normally exhorted the
industry and union representatives to a greater degree of receptivity,
pointing out the ultimate weapon of a suspension of federal funding.
Sometimes, as in Denver, 123 an agreement emerged from this process.
Sometimes, as in Pittsburgh, the government instituted a suspension
of grants. Agreements when reached sometimes became the objects of
energetic attack by minority spokesmen who did not take part in the
discussions. Some agreements, as in Boston and Denver,124 received
government approval. Others, as in Pittsburgh, did not.
For a number of reasons the course has shifted to direct intervention
by the federal government and its establishment of the area standards.
In 1969, for illustration, the Department of Labor issued the standards
for Philadelphia.125 As of this writing, Atlanta, Philadelphia, San
Francisco, Seattle and Washington, D.C. have governmentally imposed
standards. 20 In Chicago, the originally negotiated plan was found to
be unworkable, and the Labor Department has now announced plans
to impose racial quotas. 27
B. The Pittsburgh Experience
In Pittsburgh construction industry affirmative action has had a
most cloudy and contentious history. In the late summer of 1969, dis-
satisfaction in the minority community erupted into protests, street
marches and battles with police. Representatives of the Master Build-
ers Association, the craft unions, and an organization called the Black
122. For a brief summary of the pattern whereby local civil rights leaders
influenced negotiations, see TME, September 5, 1969, at 78.
123. 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 5078 (1970).
124. Id.
125. See the opinion in Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Sec.
of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
126. A discussion of the trend to federally-mandated standards, with particular
attention to developments in Atlanta, Seattle, and Washington appears in 77 BNA
LAB. REL. REP. 168 (1970).
127. According to the statement of a Labor Department spokesman, the 1970
construction season ended with not a single minority member at work under the
Plan, 165 BNA FAIR EMFL. PRAC. 1, Summary of Latest Developments.
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Construction Coalition met for several months in a heated atmos-.
phere. At stake were the federal contributions to several hospital
building projects, constructing at local universities and some industrial
construction partly dependent on federal funding. In November, 1969,
when negotiations were still at an impasse, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare announced a suspension of grants.128 The direc-
tive was that the construction industry, the trade unions and leaders
of the black community forge a solution compatible with Order No. 4.
By some informal but effective process various urban action groups
designated spokesmen to comprise the negotiating team. They operated
as the Black Construction Coalition. By and large, contractors, unions,
newspapers and officials of the federal, state and local government
acknowledged the authority of the Black Construction Coalition to
speak for the masses. While many civil right leaders criticized the
Coalition's bargaining-table decisions and its ultimate acquiescence in
the controversial Pittsburgh Plan, they did not publicly challenge the
negotiators' general authority.
Negotiations in Pittsburgh took place, as elsewhere, in the context
of affirmative action. The Coalition spokesmen insisted on the fixing
of certain quotas, waiver of apprenticeship requirements for some
minority group hirees, arrangements for circumventing some promo-
tional hurdles and early access of minority groups to the higher paying
jobs. In early 1970 the Mayor intervened and, largely under his per-
suasion, a pact known as the Pittsburgh Plan evolved on January 28,
1970.129 Several civil rights spokesmen denounced it, and one initiated
an action before the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations to
have the Plan voided.130 The critics also let their views be known to the
federal government. The Department of Labor has never approved
the Pittsburgh Plan. The moratorium continued in effect and on Sep-
tember 25, 1970, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
announced that because it still lacked evidence of the ability of con-
tractors to meet their obligations under Executive Order 11,246, the
moratorium on contract award approvals would remain in effect.' 3'
128. Memorandum of Leon E. Panetta, Director of Office for Civil Rights,
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, November 6, 1969.
129. The memorandum of understanding "Affirmative Action Program for
Minority Progress for the Construction Industry," submitted to OFCC on January
28, 1970, can be found at 1 CCH EMPL. PnAc. GumE 5014 (1970).
130. The Pittsburgh Courier, December 26, 1970, at 16. The complaint was formally
filed with the Mayor's Commission on Human Relations for the City of Pittsburgh(Docket No. C.T. 1760) and to date has not been dropped.
131. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Director of Office for Civil Rights, De-
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In total there were thirteen projects involved, with a total value of
$60,000,000 and a federal share of $10,000,000.
The disarray in Pittsburgh, not unlike that in many cities, finally
induced the federal government to mandate standards. In early 1971
the Department of Labor, under pressures to release funds for urgently
needed public and institutional facility construction, issued Bid Condi-
tions for Pittsburgh metropolitan area contractors. 182 The conditions
were strictly provisional and were subject to being voided or super-
seded by later action of the Department. 8 3 Although the Department
had not approved the Pittsburgh Plan, it nevertheless incorporated the
Plan by reference in the Conditions and declared it applicable to those
trades where both the employer and the representative union had pre-
viously subscribed to the Plan.13 4 As to non-subscribing trades, the De-
partment imposed specific quotas, 38 which in the view of some industry
representatives represent stricter and less realistic requirements than
those for crafts subject to the Plan. Some employers which had sub-
scribed to the Plan nonetheless found themselves subject to the stricter
requirements as any trade where the union had not subscribed to the
Plan.136
Through the Bid Conditions the government exacted from bidders
a number of pre-award assurances intended to reduce the risk of un-
performable pledges and breakdowns in affirmative action programs
during the life of the projects. 13 7 The parties responsible for assembling
and evaluating the evidence of contractors' commitments and abilities
to perform were the hospitals, universities and other grantees which,
in the terms of the Executive Order, constitute the "applicants" for
federal financial assistance. 38 Among the evidence was a signed pledge
which bound contractors covered by the Pittsburgh Plan to comply
with the Plan and which bound contractors not so covered to adopt
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, to the Honorable Hugh Scott,
September 25, 1970.
132. Bid Conditions--Affirmative Action Requirements, Equal Employment Op-
portunity for all federal and federally-assisted construction contracts to be awarded in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania area, consisting of Paragraphs A through R inclusive.
(Hereinafter referred to as Bid Conditions).
133. Bid Conditions, Paragraph N.
134. Id. Paragraphs B,D.
135. Id. Paragraph G.
136. Id. Paragraph G(2),(3).
137. The upheaval which occurred during dormitory construction in 1969 on the
Tufts University campus is chronicled in Chayes, Kaufman, and Wheeler, The University's
Role in Promoting Minority Group Employment in the Construction Industry, 119 U. Pa.
L. REv. 91, 101-102 (1971).
158. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4(b) (1970).
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and comply with the terms of an affirmative action plan, consisting of
eighteen steps, specified in Paragraph II of the Conditions. 139 Each
contractor, on his part, was required to obtain corresponding substan-
tiation from subcontractors. 140 Prior to award, the government re-
viewed the affirmative action plans prepared by contractors not subject
to the Pittsburgh Plan.' 4'
Among the casualties which the government sought to reduce were
those involving contractors whose affirmative action zeal might fade
in face of the trade union opposition, contractors whose written plans
might merely parrot some model used in the industry and contractors
which might proclaim affirmative action without understanding the
depth of the commitment. Consequently the Allegheny County Area
Conditions required the contractor to notify the federal contracting
agency if a union should fail to refer minority workers sent to the
union by the contractor142 and specifically removed as a defense any
claim that a union had failed to refer minority employees. 43 As indi-
cated, bidders and contractors not under the Pittsburgh Plan were
disqualified unless they produced plans setting forth the specific affir-
mative action steps specified in the Conditions. 44 Among these steps
were notification to community organizations, 145 maintenance of files
on minority workers,' 46 and participation in area training programs.147
The focal point of the undertaking is, of course, the percentage goals
established in the Pittsburgh Plan and applicable to covered contrac-
tors and the specially promulgated goals applicable to the others.148
The Conditions imposed on the contractor the burden of substantiating
a failure to achieve these goals. 49
Because of the importance of the numerical goals and governmental
emphasis on the aforementioned eighteen steps, most contractors, in
the writer's experience, did not concern themselves with the one
hundred fifty-seven paragraphs of Order No. 4 except as the principles
of Order No. 4 were included in the Bid Conditions. No reason can
139. Bid Conditions Paragraph E.
140. Id. Paragraphs E, K.
141. Id. Paragraph H.
142. Id. Paragraph Ho)(3).
143. Id. Paragraph 0.
144. Id. Paragraph H.
145. Id. Paragraph H(j)(1).
146. Id. Paragraph H()(2).
147. Id. Paragraph H(j)(4).
148. Id. Paragraph H(b).
149. Id. Paragraph N.
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be found for excusing construction industry employers from Order
No. 4.150 Many parts of Order No. 4, such as the establishment of
deficiency categories, 151 are superseded by the construction industry
plans. Other parts, however, such as periodic interviews of minority
employees, 52 recruitment in the local high schools153 and generation
of statistics 54 would appear to reinforce the specifically mandated con-
struction industry steps and perhaps to increase the probability of their
accomplishment.
VI. VICTORY IN THE COURTS
A. Dismantling Six Arguments Against Validity
In the spring of 1971 the Executive Order, to the anguish of many
devotees of the national labor policy, survived important court tests
in Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Sec. of Labor
and Southern Illinois Builders Association v. Ogilvie. Eastern Con-
tractors dealt with the Philadelphia Plan and Southern Illinois Builders
with the Ogilvie Plan designed by the state for federally-financed high-
way construction in two Illinois counties. Previously the Newark Plan
devised by the State of New Jersey had withstood litigation in Joyce
v. McCrane,5 5 and in Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dis-
trict'56 the Ohio Supreme Court had upheld an owner's decision to re-
ject the low bidder for inadequate affirmative action pledges.
Six challenges resolved by these decisions unfavorably to protesting
unions and employers are of primary concern to the practitioner. First,
there is a contention that the government in piloting the Philadelphia
Plan, Ogilvie Plan and other programs in implementation of the
Executive Order, exceeded the authority of the Executive. Secondly
the argument was raised in Eastern Contractors that affirmative action
plans conflict with two much publicized provisos to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The first proviso is found in Section 703(h),157
150. Paragraph L of the Conditions reads as follows: "Nothing herein is intended to
relieve any contractor or subcontractor during the term of its contract on this project
from compliance with Executive Order 11,246 and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Clause of its contract, with respect to matters not covered in the Pittsburgh Plan or in
Part II of these Bid Conditions."
151. Order No. 4 § 60-2.11.
152. Id. § 60-2.25(f)(6).
153. Id. § 60-2.25(e)(7).
154. Id. § 60-2.26.
155. 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D. N.J. 1970).
156. 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969) cert. denied, 896 U.S. 1004 (1970).
157. Title ViI § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
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which specifically excludes, as an unlawful employment practice, differ-
entials in pay and other conditions based on bona fide seniority and
merit systems. The second proviso, found in Section 703(j),15 disavows
an interpretation of Title VII which would require preferential treat-
ment on account of an existing imbalance (sometimes considered
Congress' rejection of quotas).
A third contention aired in these cases is that affirmative action plans
require reverse discrimination, thereby contravening the ban on dis-
crimination which is the hub of Title VII. A fourth unsuccessful
argument is that the affirmative action plans require actions by em-
ployers and unions in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act
and the national labor policy.
A further argument, urged only in Eastern Contractors, is that an
affirmative action plan may require steps in violation of a state statute
which forbids discrimination in employment. Still another argument
raised in Eastern Contractors is that an employer cannot espouse affir-
mative action and simultaneously embrace paragraph 1 of the Equal
Opportunity Clause1 59 forbidding discrimination in employment.
B. Power of the Executive
In the Eastern Contractors case there is an elaborate discussion'"0 of
the historical phase of the constitutional question, leading to conclu-
sions which are cited and quoted in part in Southern Illinois Builders.61
The Joyce court reached the same result on the brief pronouncement
that "The fundamental principle underlying the Presidential power
to require non-discrimination by contractors is found in the power of
the Federal Government to set conditions upon which anyone desiring
to do business with the United States must meet."'16 2 The opinion in
Eastern Contractors traces the origin to the Fair Employment Practice
Commission created by President Roosevelt during the Second World
War"O in conjunction with mobilization authority in a Congressional
"Act to Expedite the War Effort" enacted in December, 1941.164 Ac-
cording to the historical recital in the opinion, the program, though
158. Id. § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964).
159. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4(a)(1) (1970).
160. 442 F.2d at 176-177.
161. 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. II. 1971).
162. 320 F. Supp. at 1290.
163. Exec. Order No. 8,802, 3 C.F.R. 1938-43 Comp. 957. Exec. Order No. 9,001, 3
C.F.R. 1938-43 Comp. 1054. Exec. Order No. 9,346, 8 C.F.R. 1938-43 Comp. 1280.
164. Act of December 18, 1941, ch. 593, 55 Stat. 838.
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modified and broadened from time to time, continued under Presi-
dents Truman and Eisenhower as an attempted curb on discrimination.
Important changes by President Eisenhower were transfers of compli-
ance functions to the Government Contract Committee and deletion
of the former limitation to defense production. 165 The Kennedy Ad-
ministration, conceiving of certain positive measures, by business and
unions, added to the Equal Opportunity Clause a requirement of
affirmative action.166
On June 22, 1963, President Kennedy signed Executive Order
11,114.167 According to the constitutional analysis of the Eastern Con-
tractors court, it was particularly significant that this Order extended
affirmative action requirements, previously confined to federal procure-
ment contracts, to federally-assisted construction contracts (such as
those on which the contractors subject to the Philadelphia Plan had
bid). Finally, the court noted, Executive Order 11,246168 was signed
in 1965.
Upon completing its historical summary the court declared itself at
the edge of a chasm. It took account of the doctrine that the Executive
can fix terms and conditions applicable to procurement contracts but
pointed out the absence of any precedent for application of the doc-
trine to federally-assisted construction contracts. 69 Finding guidance
in the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,170 the court declared that when Congress authorizes
appropriations for a program of federal assistance and authorizes the
Executive to implement the program, in the absence of specific statu-
tory regulations, it must be deemed to have granted a general authority
to act for the protection of federal interests.'71 As indicated, the District
Court in the Southern Illinois Builders case incorporated that part of
the Eastern Contractors reasoning which sustained the implied author-
165. Exec. Order No. 10,482, 3 C.F.R. 1949-53 Comp. 968.
166. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 1959-63 Comp. 448. [During the early Ken-
nedy years the federal government attempted to develop a program of nationwide volun-
tary compliance. Executive Order No. 10,925, dated March 6, 1961, established the Pres-
ident's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. Affirmative action was then a
new and vague term and the commonly understood enemy remained discrimination
in employment. Some of the nation's giant employers joined the government in seeking
the machinery for overcoming the racial imbalances. At this time the women's crusade
had not climbed aboard.]
167. 3 C.F.R., 1959-63 Comp. 774.
168. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
169. 442 F.2d at 166.
170. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
171. 442 F.2d at 171.
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ity of the Executive to institute affirmative action.172 In Joyce v. Mc-
Crane, which preceded Eastern Contractors by four months, the court
did not even note a possible distinction between appropriations for
procurement and appropriations for federal assistance.
1 7 3
In considering the constitutionality of the Philadelphia, Ogilvie and
Newark Plans, each court put considerable stress on detailed statistical
findings made by federal or state agencies prior to the setting of per-
centages and the establishment of affirmative steps. These findings deal
with existing minority percentage utilization in selected crafts, with
ratios in the population and work force generally, and with such cri-
teria as feasibility as anticipated work force expansion, turnover and
trainability. The importance of these findings to the three opinions
may be a warning to the proponents of negotiated hometown solutions.
The terms incorporated in a voluntary plan are typically the product
of negotiations and do not rest on administrative findings. Whether or
not such a plan may be enforced as to the contractors and unions which
voluntarily subscribe, it is questionable whether, in the absence of
prior findings, a court would hold the implementation of the plan
through federal bid conditions to be an act within the implied author-
ity of the Executive.
C. Provisos 703(h) and 703(j) to Title VII
In Eastern Contractors, the court dealt with the contention that the
Philadelphia Plan conflicts with Sections 703(h) 174 and 703(j)17 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The contractors maintained that Section 703
(h) conveys express Congressional approval of differentials in compensa-
tion and other terms and conditions of employment when they are
based on bona fide seniority or merit systems. They also urged that
Section 7030) constituted express Congressional approval of differen-
172 327 F. Supp. at 1160.
173. See discussion at 320 F. Supp. at 1290-1291.
174. Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) reads in pertinent part, "Notwithstand-
ing any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system."
175. Title VII § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because
of the race . . . of such individual or groups on account of an imbalance which may
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race . . .
employed . . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race . . . in the available work force in any community . . . or other area."
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tials in compensation and other terms and conditions of employment
when they are based on bona fide seniority or merit systems. They
also urged that Section 703(j) constitutes express Congressional disap-
proval of the use of ratios and of remedial action incorporating ratios.
In finding no conflict between these clauses and the Executive Order,
the court declared that the clauses must be confined to Title VII and
do not express overriding Congressional policy.176 The reasoning pro-
ceeded that Title VII establishes a ban on certain types of discrimina-
tion and requires that violations be determined by certain tests. Ac-
cording to the court provisos in Section 703(h) and 703(j) simply
preclude consideration of certain seniority-related preferences and cer-
tain quota-related factors. It was concluded that nothing in the pro-
visos prevents the Executive from establishing a regulatory system
inimical to certain seniority preferences and partial towards quotas.
D. Reverse Discrimination
A more formidable issue concerned the relationship between affirma-
tive action and Title VII's prohibition of discrimination in employ-
ment. Interlocked with this question was the argument whether the
percentages in any plan constitute quotas or merely goals. The em-
ployers argued that they could not attain the precentages unless they
widened opportunities for minorities and depressed opportunities for
non-minorities.
In Southern Illinois Builders, Joyce v. McCrane and Weiner v. Cuya-
hoga Community College District,'7 7 the courts neutralized the issue
by refusing to characterize percentages as quotas. In Weiner, the Ohio
Supreme Court declared by way of dictum that: "The establishment
of a quota of employment of any particular minority would also be
discriminatory in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ''178 The
court declared that the affirmative action undertaking required of
bidders by the community college on its federally-assisted construction
project merely constituted an unequivocal assurance of equal employ-
ment opportunity. The holding was maintained that the college had
the power to disqualify the low bidder on the basis that its affirmative
action plan did not contain sufficient assurance that Negroes would be
represented in all crafts employed on the project.
176. 442 F.2d at 173.
177. 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
178. 19 Ohio St. 2d at 39, 249 N.E.2d at 910.
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While the Southern Illinois Builders case expressed an approval of
the reasoning in Eastern Contractors,79 it did not expressly adopt that
part of the opinion giving an apparent blessing to quotas. Instead, the
court stressed the fact that compliance is judged by a contractor's
demonstration of good-faith efforts. While specifically approving mini-
mum ratios adopted for the purpose of implementing affirmative action,
the Court pointed out that the benefits are available to all without re-
gard to race or color. Similarly Joyce v. McCrane contains a brief dis-
missal of the quota argument, finding the percentages to be goals only
and judging performance in terms of good faith.18 0
Eastern Contractors, however, showed no fear of the quota label and
expressly recognized the need for preferential employment practices.','
The court approvingly classified the Philadelphia Plan as "color con-
scious" and attributed to the Executive Orders a design to make govern-
ment contractors "color conscious."'1 2 In the court's view Congress did
not intend by passage of Title VII to prevent the President from at-
tempting to remedy minority disparities in the Philadelphia construc-
tion labor force. In fact in one paragraph the Third Circuit comes
within an eyelash of calling the percentages quotas. 83
E. National Labor Policy
The issue of reconciliation with the national labor policy arose in
both Eastern Contractors and Southern Illinois Builders. In Southern
Illinois Builders, craft unions and employers, in attacking the Ogilvie
plan, argued that the general obligation to submit employment ques-
tions to collective bargaining precluded them from embracing a con-
flicting system. The court held nevertheless that the Executive Order
takes precedence.
In reaching the same result Eastern Contractors held that nothing in
the National Labor Relations Act limits the contracting power of the
federal government. It is irrelevant that facets of the Philadelphia Plan
179. 327 F. Supp. at 1161.
180. 320 F. Supp. at 1291.
181. 442 F.2d at 172-173.
182. Id. at 173.
183. Finally, the plaintiffs urge that the specific goals specified by the Plan are racial
quotas prohibited by the equal protection aspect of the Fifth Amendment ...The
Philadelphia Plan is valid Executive Action designated to remedy the perceived evil
that minority tradesmen have not been included in the labor pool available for the
performance of construction projects in which the federal government has a cost and
performance interest. The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit such action. 442 F.2d
at 176-177.
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may be at variance with other contractual undertakings of the con-
tractor. In upholding Executive power the court declared:8 4
Factually it is entirely likely that the economics of the market-
place will produce an accommodation between the contract provi-
sions desired by the unions and those desired by the source of the
funds. Such an accommodation will be in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act.
F. Conflicts with State Law
The State law issue arose solely in Eastern Contractors. The con-
tractors argued that performance under the Philadelphia Plan would
require activity in conflict with Pennsylvania's direct ban on discrimi-
natory employment practices. 8 5 The court acknowledged that the
requirement in the Philadelphia Plan for maintenance of records and
forms with notations of race probably contravenes the prohibition of
such race-conscious recordkeeping in Section 5186 of the Act.8 7 Also
mentioned was the prohibition in Section 5 on the use of quotas. Never-
theless the court concluded that any conflict must be resolved in favor
of the presidential power, if otherwise validly exercised.
G. Conflict with Paragraph 1 of Equal Opportunity Clause
The contention was pressed in Eastern Contractors that programs
for special treament of disadvantaged groups conflict with the ban on
discrimination which appears in Paragraph 1 of the Equal Opportunity
Clause. The short answer of the court in refutation was that Section
201 of the Executive Order'88 empowers the Secretary of Labor through
his administrative authority to interpret the Executive Order; that the
Labor Department had interpreted affirmative action to mean more
than refraining from discrimination; and that therefore the depart-
mental interpretation must be given deference by the courts. 89 Since
the court had held that the Title VII ban on discrimination does not
preclude affirmative action, it would have been startling had the court
given such effect to the ban appearing in the Executive Order.
184. Id. at 174-175.
185. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 951 et seq.
(Supp. 1970).
186. Id. § 955.
187. 442 F.2d at 166.
188. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 201, 3 C.F.R. (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
189. 442 F.2d at 163.
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VII. THE PORTENT FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
A. The Irreconcilabilities
In the aggregate the four decisions mentioned in the preceding
chapter, while sparse, represent a judicial approval of affirmative ac-
tion. The rationale common to these cases is that affirmative action is
constitutional, that it does not conflict with Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and that it represents a limitation on the national
labor policy.
The OFCC regulations establish the machinery by which the govern-
ment may cause unions to agree to revisions in collectively bargained
clauses at variance with affirmative action.190 Unions, which have come
to rely on these clauses as impregnable, may have to prepare for their
emasculation by affirmative action. Employers reconciled to union
power must also become reconciled to affirmative action power.
A non-conforming employer can be declared ineligible for govern-
ment work.1 1 A non-conforming union can prevent an employer from
conforming and thereby cause loss of work opportunities for union
members. While the immediate targets of compliance and remedial
measures are contractors and subcontractors, the Executive Order and
the regulations definitely reach unions. For example, the Executive
Order directs the Secretary of Labor and the contracting agencies to
use their best efforts to induce cooperation by unions. 92 In the event
the Secretary believes a union to be in violation of Title VI or Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Secretary is to inform the appropriate
enforcement agency. 193
As indicated previously the national labor policy has evolved
through a long procession of rulings dealing with the scope of col-
lectively bargainable issues. Such cases might be of only academic
interest if unions lacked potency to win their demands. But another
procession of cases sustains the trade union philosophy as to what
weapons belong to unions and what weapons are denied to manage-
ment. No one has detected a shift in this court-made doctrine. Unless
this doctrine is somehow accommodated to the commands of affirmative
190. Authority reposes in 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.9(a) (1970).
191. Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§ 209, 211, 3 C.F.R. 406-407 (1970), U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp.
V, 1970); 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.24, 1.26, 1.27, 1.28, 1.30 (1970).
192. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 207, 3 C.F.R. 405 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V,
1970).
193. Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§ 207, 209(a), 3 C.F.R. 405, 406 (1970), 42 U.S.C § 2000e
(Supp V, 1970); 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.9(d) (1970).
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action, however, it is believed that certain irreconcilabilities will con-
tinue to generate crises in the srteets and in the courts. The end result
can only be a dampening of the effectiveness of affirmative action.
Some of the business decisions which management must submit to
collective bargaining include a decision to contract out work; 194 a
decision to close one plant in a multi-establishment organization; 1 95
decisions by a successor employer concerning the work force of the
predecessor; 96 a decision to perform maintenance through an inde-
pendent contractor; 197 adjusting the price of meals served to em-
ployees;' 98 and making adjustments in insurance. 99
B. Factors Which Will Perpetuate the Irreconcilabilities
A rule of bargainability is more than a mere abstract principle.
Unions normally get their demands in collective bargaining. For ex-
ample, union economic achievements publicized in late July, 1971,
included a 31 percent three-year settlement in the copper industry,200
$1.30 over three years for employees of ITT Continental Baking Com-
pany in the Midwest, 20 ' and 23% over two years for maintenance em-
ployees of American Airlines and Pan American World Airways.20 2
Union demands which most directly affect an employer's ability to meet
affirmative action commitments are those in such realms as seniority,
crew size, hiring, promotion and subcontracting. Unions have been
equally successful in these spheres.
Congress, the National Labor Relations Board and state regulatory
agencies have affirmed that unions possess the tools to get these results.
To the person unexposed to industrial warfare, it is natural to credit
the gains to bargaining table persuasiveness and to the potency of
strikes. Society is less aware of a battery of supporting weapons which
the courts and the National Labor Relations Board have declared
194. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
195. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
196. William J. Burns, International Detective Agency, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 441 F.2d
911 (2d Cir. 1971).
197. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
198. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 NLRB, 672 (1949).
199. N.L.R.B. v. Scam Instrument Corp., 394 F.2d 884 (7th Cir., 1968).
200. 682 WHAT'S NEW IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS 2 (July
22, 1971).
201. 680 WHAT'S NEW IN COLLECrIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTITIONS & CONTRACTS 1 (July
24, 1971).
202. 681 WHAT'S NEW IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTs 2 (July 8,
1971).
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available to unions. It is not the purpose of this article to lament any
imbalance in power which has resulted from these decisions. It is the
purpose to point out that the inability of some employers to fulfill
affirmative action commitments is attributable to the balance of power
in the bargaining relationship.
Consider some of the tactical advantages which unions have secured
through legislation or court decision. The National Labor Relations
Act permits union security clauses requiring employees to join the
labor organization which is the collective bargaining representative
within thirty days following the date of hire.203 When an employee with
more than thirty days of service fails to comply with payment of union
fees and dues, the union can compel the employer to discharge him.2°4
An' employer may not bypass the majority representative of his em-
ployees and deal with the employees directly or with anybody other
than the accredited representative.2 0 5 The employer may not deal with
a rival union or with another organization claiming representational
privileges. 20 6
Once a union has been established as the majority representative,
only an extraordinary chain of events can dislodge it. For a one year
period following certification no competitor can file a decertification
petition or a petition for representation. 20 7 Once an agreement has
been adopted the agreement acts as a bar on decertification petitions
and certification petitions by rival unions for the life of the agree-
ment.20 8 If employees should wish to oust the union, they must file a
decertification petition with the National Labor Relations Board dur-
ing the period beginning not more than 90 days prior to the expiration
of the contract and not less than 60 days prior thereto.20 9 The human
traits of apathy, inattentiveness and inefficiency favor the perpetuation
of the once certified union.
When a strike is in effect, the public may think that the tests of
endurance are the employees' ability to forego compensation and the
employer's ability to operate with supervisors and green replacements.
A number of less recognized forces support the effort of the strikers.
203. § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
204. N.L.R.B. v. Broderick Wood Products Co., 261 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1958) (dicta).
205. General Electric Co. and International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO, 150 NLRB 192 (1964).
206. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
207. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1964).
208. General Cable Corp., 139 NLRB 1123 (1962). The National Labor Relations
Board has declared three years to be the maximum period of effectiveness of the bar.
209. Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 NLRB 1000 (1962).
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Whatever may be the reader's philosophical view of concerted action,
the reader must keep in mind that factors which favor the union and
strikers also tend to perpetuate the irreconcilabilities between the na-
tional labor policy and affirmative action.
The striking union may post pickets at the place of business of the
struck employer's customer.210 If the employer tries to fulfill any cus-
tomer orders by farming out work to another enterprise, the union may
picket that enterprise on the rationale that it is an ally of the struck
employer.2 1 ' If the employer somehow persuades numbers of the
striking union to cross the picket line and come to work, the union
may fine these individuals. 21 2
In the classical sense one safeguard against unrestrained industrial
warfare should be the ability of employers to hire replacements. But
the struck employer is severely limited as to the group from which it
can draw. Congress has declared the act of importing strike breakers
from other states to be a federal crime.213 A Pennsylvania statute has
the effect of limiting the employer to substitute workers who appear
casually in response to the employer's invitation to work and who have
not been recruited by an agency unrelated to the employer. The agency
found to be engaged in such recruiting on behalf of struck employers
is guilty of a misdemeanor.21 4 In the Pennsylvania "Labor Anti-Injunc-
tion Act," specifying the limited conditions under which state courts
may enjoin strikes, a proviso disqualifies an employer from obtaining
an injunction if he has engaged non-employees as substitutes.211
Some scholars who defend the right to strike argue that the stoppage
causes a void in workers' compensation which acts to import reason
into bargaining table demands and to fore-shorten the duration of
the conflict. In this connection it should be noted that in New York
strikers become eligible for unemployment compensation benefits after
seven weeks.2 1 6 If the state is to provide a partial replacement for lost
210. N.L.R.B. v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760, 377
U.S. 58 (1964).
211. N.L.R.B. v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board,
Local 459, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955).
212. N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, rehearing denied, 389 U.S.
892 (1967).
213. 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1964). Under the terms of this statute it is a criminal offense
for an employer to transport individuals from one state into his state for the purpose of
crossing a picket line at his plant.
214. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206 (1961). Excluded from the Act are licensed employ-
ment agents and the Pennsylvania and United States Employment Service.
215. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206(m) (1961).
216. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 592(1) (McKinney (1965)).
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earnings, it should follow that strikers will be able to hold out for
longer periods of time and will be able to exact broader concessions
from employers. Among these concessions might be terms and condi-
tions of employment desired by the union but incompatible with
affirmative action.
The struck employer may find that employees of his suppliers and
truckers are restrained from crossing the picket line at his struck
premises. The union representing the employees of these suppliers and
truckers may legally exact from their employer a clause in the ap-
plicable collective bargaining agreement which exonerates the em-
ployees for refusal to cross a picket line.217
Thus, the union's tactical array is much more formidable than the
bare power to withhold labor from the struck establishment. It is sub-
mitted that the employer who is besieged by such weapons will yield
such issues as seniority, promotions, apprenticeship, and hiring halls
in order to tone down demands in the economic realm. The realist
must recognize that employers do not have the means to exact the
reforms expected of them by the Department of Labor, the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance, and various civil rights and enforcement
agencies.
VIII. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GRIGGS CASE
For the attorney who is studying the escalating conflict between af-
firmative action and the national labor policy, a complete view re-
quires an awareness of parallel developments under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the much noticed Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,218 which dealt exclusively with Title VII, the affirmative action
enthusiast can find encouragement for certain vital precepts mellowed,
however, by an unsettling reticence of the Supreme Court to bless
preferential employment practices. The case was a resounding triumph
for the champions of some progressive interpretation of an employer's
civil rights obligations. It at least partly legitimates the use of statistics
as a measure of an employer's compliance with Title VII. It holds em-
ployers responsible for the results of perpetuating the effects of past
discrimination. It holds that hiring and promotional criteria which are
seemingly neutral or nondiscriminatory on their face, are nonetheless
217. 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
218. 401 U.S. 425 (1971).
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invalid if they are not related to job performance, if they tend to
perpetuate the effects of past discrimination, or if they tend to limit
employment opportunities for a culturally deprived minority.
Five departments comprised the defendant's facility in Griggs. At
the time the action was instituted there were 95 employees of whom
14 were Negroes. All but one of the blacks worked in the labor depart-
ment. The highest rated job in labor paid less than the lowest rated
jobs in the other four departments.
In 1955 the company had instituted a requirement of a high school
education for initial assignment to any department except labor. Up
to July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
employer prohibited promotion from labor into other departments.
On lifting this restriction, the company extended the previously im-
posed prerequisite of a high school education to prospects for transfer
from labor or other departments.
On July 2, 1965, the company also made satisfactory completion of
certain aptitude tests a requirement for transfer. Critical to the holding
against the company was the court's conclusion that these tests did not
bear a demonstrable relation to the jobs for which candidates were
being considered and, further, that the tests and the diploma require-
ment tended to favor whites over Negroes because of segregation of
education in North Carolina.
Among the precepts of affirmative action seemingly bolstered by the
Griggs' decision are the emphasis on racial disproportions within a
work force, the requirement that employers become deficiency con-
scious and color conscious and the vulnerability of subtle barriers
against integration.
One passage in the case, however, may portend a setback for affirma-
tive action and for the rationale of the Eastern Contractors decision
announced six weeks later. In construing the intent of Title VII, the
Supreme Court said:
In short the Act does not command that any person be hired
simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or
because he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory pref-
erence for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only
what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissible classification.2 1 9
219. 401 U.S. at 430-431.
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This language is, arguably, not compatible with the statement in the
Eastern Contractors opinion that Title VII countenances color-con-
scious remedial action designed to correct past injustices. 2 0 In short
the Griggs' statement may jeopardize the ability of employers to adopt
quota-related hiring, training and promotion measures and force em-
ployers to a double standard, pursuant to which they must correct past
injustices while maintaining totally non-discriminatory current poli-
cies.221
IX. PRIMER FOR DRAFTSMAN OF AN AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PLAN
A. The Project
Actual production of the comprehensive written plan sometimes
occurs during the last seventy-two hours available to a construction
contractor to get bid clearance, in ten days to two weeks following the
government's letter announcement of a compliance review or in a short
grace period permitted by the compliance officer after the officer cites
various deficiencies. Because of the extensive logistical, administrative
and attitudinal problems inherent in the adoption of a written affirma-
tive action plan it is recommended that an employer, which recognizes
its accountability, not await the emergency.
This chapter will cover only a half dozen important features of an
affirmative action plan. It is recommended, however, that the draftsman
absorb the numerous provisions of Order No. 4222 and try to project
each of them into a final plan. The draftsman will find guidance in
plans previously prepared by other companies in his industry and by
samples appearing in some of the employment practices services.2 23
While some compliance officers are impressed by mere sentence volume,
many try to penetrate to the substance of a plan. In the construction
industry, as indicated previously, various phases of a plan (such as the
percentage goals) are dictated by a community-wide plan or by govern-
ment bid conditions. Also in the construction industry the government
requires undertakings over and above those in Order No. 4.224
220. 442 F.2d at 159.
221. In the concluding paragraphs of the Griggs opinion appears the additional quali-
fication, "Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the
better qualified simply because of minority origins." 401 U.S. at 436.
222. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1970).
223. E.g., The plan for Arthur D. Little Inc. is reproduced in 1 CCH EMaL. PRAMCrCES
GUIDE 5023 (1970).
224. For a detailed discussion see pp. 17-22 supra.
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The aspects of an affirmative action plan considered in this chapter
are fixing of percentages, recruiting, interviewing, career motivations,
relations with minority agencies, and programs for the hard core. In
addition, there is a look at the special problems involved in reaching
a negotiated plan with civil rights advocates.
B. Percentages
Percentages govern the identification of deficiency categories and the
setting of goals. 225 An employer outside the construction industry may
take the initiative in setting a base.226 It is recommended that the em-
ployer determine the realistic geographical circumference of his labor
market and then martial data by which to defend that choice during a
compliance review. 227 In the age of the automobile it is plausible to
contend that workers will gravitate to a plant from all regions of the
county in which it is located.
Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Indianapolis show interesting
tussles with percentages. The Chicago Plan, dated January 12, 1970,
aims over a period of not more than five years at "a level of minority
group employees at least proportionate to their percentage in the
community at large." 228 In the Philadelphia Plan the figures vary from
trade to trade, and the average attainment after four years is to be
20%.229 In Indianapolis the base used for formulating a proportion is
Marion County, 23 0 a metropolitan area considerably broader than the
city itself.
The minority manpower utilization tables in the previously dis-
cussed Bid Conditions for Pittsburgh 231 would appear to defy logical
explanation. Insofar as the crafts included in the Pittsburgh Plan are
concerned, the percentages are relatively moderate. For example, by
1975, plumbers must reach 9.2%, bricklayers 13% and steamfit-
225. Order No. 4 § 60-2.11.
226. See discussion p. 25 supra.
227. In the Eastern Contractors decision, the Third Circuit expressly approved theSecretary of Labor's adoption of percentages based on minority representation in the
five-county Philadelphia area. 442 F.2d at 164.
228. Text of the negotiated Chicago Plan appears in 1 CCH EMPL. PRACrcES
GUIDE 5013 (1970). The government has now declared the plan unworkable and intends
to promulgate standards for Chicago. See discussion p. 18 supra.
229. A summary of the Philadelphia Plan figures is included in the opinion in Eastern
Contractors at 159.
230. A summary of the Indianapolis Plan appears in 1 CCH EMPL. PRACTICrES GumE
5064 (1970).
231. See discussion pp. 20-22 supra.
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ters 12%.232 These figures may be contrasted with the goals applicable
to non-signatory crafts, such as sheet metal workers, 26.9%; operating
engineers, 48.3%; roofers, 50.1%; and.tile setters, 50.1%.233 The ana-
lyst of these figures should keep in mind that blacks comprise only
9% of the population of Allegheny County, in which Pittsburgh is
situated.234
C. Recruiting and Interviewing
The portions of the affirmative action plan dealing with recruiting
must be linked to the deficiency categories and to the goals. It is recom-
mended that the writer of a company's plan attempt to explain the
conditions which have generated the deficiencies and the steps being
taken to reverse some of those conditions.23 5 A whole range of tech-
niques are available. Those with most credibility among compliance
officers are direct dealings with minority manpower sources. 236 Because
these centers do not have active, alert staffs, it is the employer's respon-
sibility to prod and cultivate the centers. Each contact, whether by
letter or by telephone, should be documented.
The employer should also send recruiters into high schools and
trade schools with heavy minority concentrations. 23 7 The minority
media are still another fertile source of minority applicants. 238 It is
recommmended that the employer temporarily suspend those recruit-
ing activities which have normally produced non-minority applicants.
Interviewing techniques should be elaborately covered in the plan.2 39
The plan should indicate how the interviewers are chosen and what
special steps they take in order to build self-confidence in minority
interviewees. While employment application forms may not reveal race,
OFCC now requires a notation of the race of each individual inter-
viewed.2 40 This notation preferably should go on a separate card to
232. Order No. 4 §§ 60-2.11,2.24.
233. Id.
234. Pittsburgh Press, Mar. 3, 1971, at 32, col. 1.
235. Order No. 4 §§ 60-2.11, 2.24.
236. Id. § 60-2.25(c)(1).
237. Id. § 60-2.25(e)(7).
238. Id. § 60-2.25(e)(10).
239. Id. § 60-2.23(a)(3).
240. Id. § 60-2.23(a)(2). A technical disparity between OFCC and the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission arises from the positions of the agencies regarding
records of the race of applicants for employment. An employer cannot maintain the
applicant flow data required by OFCC without noting and recording race. EEOC offi-
cially discourages such records. In order that an employer can complete the racial
breakdowns of existing employees required by Form EEO-l, EEOC recommends visual
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be maintained in a separate confidential file of interviewees. It is to be
remembered that when compliance reviews occur, OFCC asks for
racial breakdowns of interviewees.
The affirmative action plan must identify the role played by the
interviewer in the ultimate decision on hiring and must identify all
other officials involved in that decision.2 41 If minorities are a dispro-
portionately low percentage of persons interviewed, the employer must
have an explanation at the time of a compliance review.2 42 If minorities
are a disproportionate percentage of interviewees accepted for employ-
ment, the employer must likewise have an explanation at the time of a
compliance review. 243
D. Career Motivations; Programs for the Hard-Core
Career ladders are essential to affirmative action plans. In the great
bulk of American companies minority workers are clustered in the
lower-paying classifications. One of the aims of affirmative action is
their dispersion throughout the work force and their advancement into
the higher-paying ranks. In this phase of the affirmative action plan
and its implementation, charts and statistics are critical.2 44
Order No. 4 recommends stimulation of the minority employee
through periodic interviews by informed and sensitive personnel man-
agers.2 45 Each interview should be documented and the report sheet
retained for the compliance review. The employer's personnel section
should consult periodically with minority employee's foreman and de-
partment head in order to ferret out potential and to ascertain prob-
lems.246 Among the recommended records are monthly or quarterly
transfer reports, in which the employer logs each movement within the
plant and notes the race of each transferee.2 47 In addition minority
workers should be encouraged to participate in company-sponsored
training and improvement programs and should be encouraged to en-
roll in training programs outside the plant walls. 248
surveys, with any notations of an employee's race to be kept in a file separate from his
personnel file. Rules of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Part 1602.
241. Id. § 60-2.25(d).
242. Id. §§ 60-2.11(c), 2.23(b)(3),(8).
243. Id.
244. Id. §§ 60-2.11(c), 2.25(f)(2).
245. Id. §§ 60-2.22(b)(6), 2.25(f)(6).
246. Id. §§ 60-2.22(b)(4),(5), 2.25(f)(3).
247. Id. § 60-2.26(a).
248. Id. §§ 60-2.23(b)(9), 2.25(e)(8).
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Larger companies should devote several pages of their affirmative
action plans to special programs for the hard-core.249 In this area
of endeavor it is possible to produce some most revealing graphs and
statistics. For example, an employer with a strong counselling program
can, by graph, show fall-offs in absenteeeism and tardiness. Other graphs
can show the increasing adaptability of hard-core recruits to production
processes and other stresses. The documentation may cover such special-
ized matters as detection of drug addiction and programs for cure.
E. Community Relations
Order No. 4 frequently refers to an employer's relationships with
community civil rights organizations without suggesting the mechanics
of such relationships. 250 A smart employer will cultivate the interest of
two or three such organizations and their leaders through modest finan-
cial contributions to their programs and through attendance at some of
their functions. Competent community action organizations will pro-
duce minority applicants, provide counselling for minority employees
and, on a very practical basis, support an employer before a skeptical
compliance officer.
F. The Negotiated Plan
Employers and unions often call on their attorneys to represent
them in meetings during which affirmative action programs are nego-
tiated. The most celebrated instances have occurred at city-wide nego-
tiations involving the construction industry. Such talks go on in the
shadow of Executive Order 11,246, because so many institutional build-
ing programs are federally-assisted construction contracts.
Acceptance by the employer of civil rights spokesmen in such dis-
cussions is entirely voluntary. The OFCC Regulation requires only
that the employer design his own affirmative action program, keep
community action agencies informed and submit the program to a
federal compliance review. Many employers have, nonetheless, sub-
mitted their affirmative action plans to the negotiating process. Fre-
quently, the techniques, of protest, picketing and denunciations in the
media influence an employer to acquiesce in this procedure. The em-
249. Id. § 60-2.25(e)(8).
250. Id. §§ 60-2.12(h), 2.21(b)(3), 2.22(b)(2), 2.25(e), 2.27.
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ployer may or may not be the holder of a federal contract or subcon-
tract or an applicant for assistance in a federally-assisted construction
contract.
The minority group may represent a substantial block of the em-
ployer's customers or may dominate the neighborhood in which the
employer's facility is located. Sometimes a local government agency,
by authority of its own human relations ordinance, becomes involved
and steers the protagonists to the bargaining table.2 51 Again, the em-
ployer may or may not be within the coverage of the Executive Order.
An employer's counsel faced with such a situation must inform his
client that they are operating in a medium distinct from typical col-
lective bargaining and commercial negotiations. The proponents of
the minority group cause are representing people who are justifiably
frustrated and who have grown instinctively skeptical. Their principal
weapons are picketing, publicity, consumer boycott and the invocation
of assistance from OFCC.
The employer should seek to involve all of his labor unions directly
in these discussions and should require the unions' concurrrence in
any agreements. Some unions decline to attend and attempt to take
shelter in the fortress of the collective bargaining agreement. Others
prefer to attend in order to keep the employer mindful of obligations
under the national labor policy and in order to protect the rights of
their constituents.
The minority spokesmen will try to extract agreements from the
employer to vary some collectively bargained institution, such as plant-'
wide seniority or the union shop clause. The employer who acquiesces
in such a demand without the concurrence of the union must realize
that all the rhetoric and compulsion of minority leaders will not help
him in selling the proposition to the union or in overcoming an un-
fair labor practice charge before the National Labor Relations Board.
No federal agency will help the employer in convincing the union
and rank and file to approve the proposition.252
251. An ordinance (Pittsburgh, Pa. Ordinance No. 75, § 7(e)(f), February 28, 1967)
authorizes the Commission on Human Relations to study and investigate conditions
having an adverse effect on intergroup relations in the city and to conduct programs
to promote understanding among persons of different groups. When a dispute exists in
the minority relations field, the Commission does on occasions foster deliberations be-
tween the protagonists and make its staff available in a mediative role. Participation
by the Commission is not dependent on its receipt of a formal complaint.
252. The absence of compassion on the part of the Labor Department for the em-
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During negotiations, the employer should seek to keep local gov-
ernment officials informed, but prevent them from steering the parties
into a purely political settlement. The employer and his counsel and
the union and its counsel must be prepared to draw on resources of
patience, ingenuity and tact.
Above all, it is the job of counsel for the employer to assure that
the solution of the minority issue will do the least possible damage
to productivity, that it will not vitiate the few management preroga-
tives which the employer has retained during collective bargaining
with the union, and that it contains workable goals and programs ca-
pable of achievement. To fulfill some typical affirmative action plans
would entail creating unnecessary positions, penalizing existing em-
ployees and jumping unit costs. Finally, because the supply of minority
group labor is often limited, the plan should commit the employer to
good-faith efforts rather than to inalterable goals.
X. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Section 201 of Executive Order 11,246 lodges administrative re-
sponsibility in the Secretary of Labor. 53 By order of Labor Secretary
Willard Wirtz, the responsibility for carrying out the provisions of
the Executive Order, as amended, was assigned to the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance. 54 That Office has, in turn, vested administrative
authority in special civil rights sections created by most governmental
departments and some executive agencies. 2 5 They regulate employers
by the machinery of compliance reviews and complaint investigations.
ployer trapped between affirmative action and the national labor policy is shown by the
facts in Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Wirtz, 281 F. Supp. 337 (Dist. D.C., 1968). In 1967
Crown, a federal contractor subject to the Executive Order, was under a threat of
debarment because of the government's dissatisfaction with the negotiated seniority
provisions. Since 1967 was a union contract expiration year, Crown took the opportunity
to propose the revisions which the government had declared to be conditions to avoiding
debarment. According to the court's findings, the government made no efforts to assist
Crown in its dealings with the union, and collective bargaining resulted in an impasse
on the seniority issue. Following the impasse OFCC announced an intent to impose
sanctions. Both Crown and the union applied for an injunction against the government.
In awarding a preliminary injunction, the district court made specific note of Crown's
obligations under the National Labor Relations Act. The order restrained the govern-
ment from taking any action under the Executive Order until Crown and the union
were afforded a full evidentiary hearing on the question of compliance with equal
employment opportunity.
253. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 201, 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V,
1970).
254. Secretary's Order No. 15-68 (August 8, 1968).
255. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.6 (1970).
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A. The Compliance Review
When the amount of a government contract outside the construc-
tion field exceeds $1,000,000, the federal department or agency respon-
sible for the grant must clear the affirmative action credentials of the
successful bidders prior to award. 56 In those cities with construction
industry programs covered by government bid conditions or by volun-
tary hometown plans, the minimum is typically $500,000.257 Some
employers are failing to qualify because their collective bargaining
agreements limit their ability to take the initiative in upgrading the
minority's share of work. This disqualification also penalizes the work-
ers customarily attached to that employer and the union which repre-
sents those workers. In such cases awards may go to a second or third
low bidder which is non-union or which has found some technique
for building minority participation in the work force.25 8
Whether or not a given employer is required to fulfill pre-award
clearances, that employer can expect periodic compliance reviews by
a civil rights office of the department with which the employer's work
is most frequently allied.259 The civil rights office typically affords the
employer ten days to two weeks warning and requests the assembly
in advance of rather elaborate records and statistics. 260 During the re-
view the compliance officer examines the statistics, interviews minority
employees chosen at random, inspects personnel records, studies the
affirmative action plan and checks compliance with certain formal re-
quirements, such as posting of the government's equal opportunity
posters, inclusion of the equal opportunity legend in recruitment ad-
vertising and securing of equal opportunity documentation from sub-
contractors.
Various types of deficiencies may be noted. An industrious compli-
ance officer will note statistical imbalances Iin certain parts of the work
force and will require the employer to pledge specific remedial steps,
sometimes accompanied by timetables. These recommendations may
256. Id. §§ 60-1.7(b), 1.20(d).
257. E.g., Philadelphia Plan as described in Eastern Contractors at 163; St. Louis
Plan as mentioned in 167 BNA FAIR EMPL. Pacrlcs 1, Summary of Latest Develop-
ments, July 15, 1971. In the early summer of 1971, OFCC issued guidelines to assist
in the federal reviews of construction contractors. The guidelines were not available
to the author at the time of this writing.
258. See Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249
N.E.2d 907 (1969) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
259. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.6(a) (1970).
260. Id. § 60-1.7(a). A normal requirement is an updated compilation of the data
required by Form EEO-l.
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require action at variance from a collective bargaining agreement.2 1'
They may require actions which, while not in conflict with the agree-
ment, would be more feasible if the employer were free from collec-
tive bargaining entanglements.
B. The Complaint Investigation
When a complaint has been received from an aggrieved employee,
from a civil rights organization, or from another spokesman, 262 the
responsible government agency is to initiate a prompt investigation. 263
It is no secret that the compliance offices regard complainants as clients
for whom results must be shown. On a complaint investigation, Regu-
lation 60-1 charges the compliance officer with the examination of the
facts of the complaint and with the formation of a judgment as to
the employer's violation of the Equal Opportunity Clause.26 If the
investigation indicates a violation, the government normally attempts
resolution by conciliation during which remedial action is recom-
mended. Because compliance reviews and complaint investigations are
intertwined, the steps recommended by the government may include
broad affirmative action programs as well as specific relief to the ag-
grieved individual. For the employer who resists, the hazard is subjec-
tion to a hearing. 265 It must be recognized that the government does
not have the authority to order specific correctional action but does
have the authority to impose sanctions if the recommended action is
not taken.
During a compliance review instigated by a complaint, the employer
finds himself caught in an unfamiliar game. In the author's experience,
the compliance officer normally withholds the name of the complainant
and refrains from disclosing the contents of the complaint. The ratio-
nale, of course, is that once armed with the information, the employer
can make short-term, artificial improvements. If the issue proceeds to
261. Id. § 60-1.9 instructs the Director of OFCC to take steps to persuade labor
unions to cooperate in the revision of collective bargaining agreements which impair
compliance. The Director is empowered to hold hearings concerning the powers
against unions tantamount to the power to debar nonconforming employers, the Regu-
lation does instruct the Director to refer to enforcement agencies such Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission the conclusions and recommendations of the Director
respecting uncooperative unions.
262. Id. § 60-1.21 states filing may be by an employee of a contractor, an applicant for
employment or the complainant's authorized representative.




hearing, the governing rules are those applicable to hearings preceding
debarment for noncompliance and discussed in the following sub-
chapter.
C. Sanctions and Compulsion
A hearing may follow an unsuccessful attempt at conciliation of a
complaint, or a finding of deficiencies by a compliance office, or a
denial by an employer of data demanded by a compliance officer.
The last of the three involves a direct challenge by the employer to
the power of the compliance office. As a practical matter most em-
ployers with government contracts or subcontracts can not afford to
challenge the investigatory methods. The Equal Opportunity Clause,
to which employers must subscribe in order to qualify for government
work, contains a commitment (Paragraph 5) to permit inspection of
the employer's records. 266 There is no requirement in Paragraph 5
for the preparation of records, but compliance offices typically expect
lists to be available. 267 An employer who decides to object to the scope
of the review or the techniques used hazards exposure to a hearing at
which the only issue is the government's power to interpret its au-
thority under the Executive Order.
When the issue is unremedied deficiencies, the Director of OFCC
or the head of the contracting agency must, by written notice, afford
the employer at least ten days to comply or to request a hearing.268
If the contractor elects a hearing, the Director of OFCC may, in his
discretion, suspend the contractor's contracts pending the hearing.269
If the contractor does not request a hearing, the Director or the head
266. Paragraph 5 of the Clause reads:
The contractor will furnish all information and reports required by Executive Order
11246 of September 24, 1965, and by the rules, regulations, and orders of the
Secretary of Labor, or pursuant thereto, and will permit access to his books, records,
and accounts by the contracting agency and the Secretary of Labor for purposes of
investigation to ascertain compliance with such rules, regulations, and orders.
267. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a)(3)(4) provides that OFCC may require a contractor to keep
employment records and to furnish, in the form requested, (emphasis added) such in-
formation as OFCC deems necessary for the administration of the order. An employer
concerned that data voluntarily submitted may be disseminated to other agencies should
take account of the provision that "Reports filed pursuant to this section shall be used
only in connection with the administration of the order, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
or in furtherance of the purposes of the order and said Act." Id. § 60-1.7(c).
268. Id. § 60-1.26. As a matter of practice a conciliation period, typically thirty days
in duration, precedes the issuance of this notice.
269. Id. § 60-1.26. This option, in the author's view, gives the government
strong leverage. A short suspension of eligibility can disrupt a company's relations with
its customers on both government and civilian work.
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of the agency may cancel, suspend or terminate contracts and declare
the contractor ineligible for future work. Hearings are convened by
the Director or agency head and conducted by a hearing officer ap-
pointed by the convening authority. If the issue of compliance relates
to a collective bargaining agreement, the labor organization may be
present. Recommendations of the hearing officer shall be referred to
the authority which convened the hearing, and that authority shall
make the final decision. The Director of OFCC must approve a final
decision by an agency head.
In some quarters the enforcement methods under the Executive
Order are decried as slow and ineffective. 270 These comments overlook
the leverage of the OFCC in encouraging compliance without formal
remedial action. The employer or union charged with a violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can anticipate an EEOC
investigation and conciliation procedure before the complainant gains
the right to sue.271 If a federal court action is initiated,272 the union
and the employer have the rights of litigation defendants. By contrast,
the employer who is unable or unwilling to comply with a citation of
deficiencies under the Executive Order hazards an agency hearing
within a few weeks, a possible suspension of eligibility pending the
hearing, and penalties of suspension, termination or ineligibility fol-
lowing the hearing.
One illustration is a recent agency hearing involving a second-tier
subcontractor on a federally-financed college project.273 The hearing
examiner found the subcontractor to be subject to the Philadelphia
Plan, found that it had adopted no minority hiring goals, and found
that it had hired no minority workers during the project. On these
grounds the hearing officer recommended that the subcontract be can-
celled, that the respondent receive no pay for work done, and that it
be declared ineligible for other government work.
270. It has been noted that from 1965 to mid-1968 no contracts were cancelled,
suspended or terminated and that "even today," although notices of proposed in-
eligibility have been issued and hearings held concerning three contractors, no sanctions
have been applied. Comment, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, at 1286 (1971). The OFCC results have been
labeled "the thin record of agency enforcement." Chayes, Kaufman, and Wheeler, The
University's Role in Promoting Minority Group Employment in the Construction In-
dustry, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 108 (1971).
271. Title VII §§ 706(a), (e), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(a), (e) (1964).
272. Title VII § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) (1964).
273. In the Matter of Edgely Air Products Inc., Administrative Proceeding in U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Docket No. CC-1, March 23, 1971, re-
ported in 1 CCH EMPL. PRAatiCES GurDE 5163 (1970).
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D. Stimulation to Other Agencies
Stimulation is in the form of information and advice referred to
federal enforcement agencies in the civil rights field, and in the form
of inspiration to other agencies, both state and federal' which conduct
compliance reviews of organizations within their jurisdiction.
The Executive Order and implementing regulations provide for
notifications to the Department of Justice, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission and other appropriate federal agencies. 274 Some of
the subjects of notification are unions which by policy or practice im-
pede equal employment opportunity,275 employers against whom com-
plaints are received by OFCC or one of the contracting agencies, 276
and employers who fail to agree to remedial action recommendations
following a compliance review. 277 The decision to refer information is
discretionary with the Director of OFCC or the agency responsible
for compliance.
The contact of state enforcement agencies with affirmative action is
twofold. In the first instance, some of them, acting under authority of
the enabling legislation of the state or municipality from which they
derive their power, are administering affirmative action standards gov-
erning contracts with the state or municipality. 27 In the second in-
stance, the state and local civil rights agencies also conduct investiga-
tions, conciliations and adjudications of conventional complaints of
bias under the ban against discrimination in the enabling legislation.
In the author's experience, some agencies are fusing the two realms of
activity, and the affirmative action approach is becoming the domi-
nant one.
Insofar as the public contractors are concerned, these agencies
evaluate the employer's positive performance on the rationale that the
sovereign can fix the terms on which it purchases goods and services,
and the contractor may refrain from selling to the sovereign.279 When
they adjudicate conventional complaints, the criterion, in the context
274. Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§ 207, 209, 3 C.F.R. 405, 406 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e
(1964).
275. Id.
276. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209, 3 C.F.R. 406 (1970), 42'U.S.C. § 2000-e (1964); 41
C.F.R. § 60-1.27 (1970).
277. Id.
278. Examples are Michigan, MIcHi. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 458(4) (1968); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.59 (1969); and Pittsburgh Executive Order of the Mayor, No-
vember 1, 1968.
279. Discussion pp. 23-25 supra.
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of the statute, is whether the employer has refrained from proscribed
conduct. That the agencies have blurred the distinction is shown by
the scope of interrogatories issued during complaint investigations and
by questions propounded at hearings. Employers not subject to affirma-
tive action requirements have been asked to identify the steps taken
by the employer to inculcate line supervision in affirmative action;
grants by the employer to minority neighborhood projects; and the
employer's efforts to stimulate promotional objectives among minority
employees.280
XI. PREEMPTION
A. The National Labor Policy
Preemption issues arise in two settings. First, there is the question
explored in an earlier chapter of the ability of OFCC and the contract-
ing agencies to require action which necessitates an employer's violating
the duty to bargain with the union which represents the employer's
employees. Second, there is the conflict between programs under the
Executive Order and proceedings before Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission or a state or local agency.
To the chagrin of attorneys for unions and management, it has be-
come clear that the national labor policy does not preclude orders in
Title VII cases even when they upset collectively bargained provisions
or limit the options and alternatives available to the parties during
collective bargaining.28' Similarly, the Eastern Contractors282 and South-
ern Illinois Builders2s3 cases hold that minority hiring and advance-
ment programs instituted by the federal government under Executive
Order 11,246 take precedence over such terms of employment as an
employer may have negotiated with the union. Stated differently, the
280. A possible rationalization for this approach may be in the wording of that clause
of the underlying statute or ordinance which provides for the form of relief in the event
the finding is that the respondent has engaged in a discriminatory practice. Some state
and local enactments have used language similar to the following in Section 706(g) of
Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5) (1964).
The court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include
reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay. ...
See N.Y. HUMAN RIGHTS LAw, § 297(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1970) OHIO STAT. ANN. tit. 41
§ 4112.05(6) (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 959 (Supp. 1970); Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordi-
nance 75 § 13(i), February 28, 1967.
281. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 35183 (2d Cir. June 21, 1971).
282. 442 F.2d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 1971).
283. 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. 111. 1971).
Duquesne Law Review
government can disqualify a contractor on account of policies adopted
by him and the union in fulfillment of their obligations under the
national labor policy.
There had been good reason for union and company attorneys to
anticipate that the national labor policy would remain preeminent.
In a series of rulings, highlighted by San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon,28 4 the courts have held that the National Labor
Relations Act and the regulatory system administered by the National
Labor Relations Board oust federal courts, state courts and state labor
boards of jurisdiction. The rationale has been the necessity for a sym-
metrical, consistent and comprehensive field of regulation.2 5 Title VII
and the Executive Order contain no relief for employers or unions from
their obligations under the national labor policy. It is entirely conceiv-
able that an employer or union could be charged under the National
Labor Relations Act with a refusal to bargain in good faith on account
of unilateral action taken under the compulsion of affirmative action.
In brief, the government can compel a wide range of steps by the
employer in the employment arena, but the employer must gain the
union's concurrence to those steps which are collectively bargainable
subjects.
The dilemma of the unionized institution is shown by an arbitration
award entitled Hotel Employers Association.2 16 According to the arbi-
tral findings, an association, representing various San Francisco hotels
and subject to a labor agreement with the grieving union, entered
into a hiring and advancement agreement with various minority rights
organizations dated July 16, 1966. The negotiations leading to this
agreement were the result, according to the opinion, of marches, pro-
tests, threats and governmental persuasion. The Board of Arbitration
by order dated November 17, 1966, sustained the union's grievance,
declaring the civil rights agreement to be in derogation of the labor
agreement's recognition clause, to be a supplantation of the authority
of the union under the National Labor Relations Act, to be in con-
flict with seniority and other collectively bargained provisions, and to
constitute a scheme for unlawful discrimination in favor of Negroes.
The Board ordered the employers to refrain from complying with the
284. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
285. Recent reaffirmation was in Street, Electric R.R. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 39 U.S.L.W. 4741 (U.S. June 14, 1971).
286. 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966).
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civil rights agreement and to refrain from dealing with the various
minority group organizations.
B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Preemption is also an issue when employment matters regulated
under the Executive Order are the subject of proceedings under Title
VII or under state or local civil rights enactments. It is not known
whether the respondent in a Title VII case or in a state or local pro-
ceeding has argued preemption by OFCC. There are numerous cases,
helpful by analogy only, dealing with the power of a federal district
court to entertain a complaint instituted under Title VII when the
subject matter of the complaint is also the basis of a proceeding before
the National Labor Relations Board,28 7 an arbitrator appointed pur-
suant to the labor agreement, 288 or a state civil rights commission. 2 9
As to those controversies, the doctrine is in its formative stage. A
premise gaining acceptability is that Title VII's jurisdiction is not ex-
clusive and does not preempt the other tribunals in the sense that the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board preempts other
tribunals.
Since the Executive Order provides for referrals from OFCC to
EEOC,290 no contention can be made that filing of a complaint with
OFCC precludes redress under Title VII or that the Executive Order
preempts EEOC and the federal courts insofar as complaints against
government contractors are concerned. The Executive Order and the
implementing regulations do not provide a self-sufficient complaint
mechanism, for the only corrective action available to OFCC is the
imposition of sanctions against a contractor found to have violated the
Equal Opportunity Clause.291
287. Tipler v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971). (Prior conclusion of NLRB unfair
labor practice proceeding adverse to complainant does not preclude Title VII action).
288. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 439 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afj'd, 401 U.S. 932
(1971). (Submission of the grievance to arbitration under the labor agreement was a bind-
ing election).
289. Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 321 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); Marquez v.
Sales Office, Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Neb. 1970). From these cases emerges
a doctrine of limited concurrent jurisdiction. Although the complainant has recourse to
both the state civil rights procedure and the Title VII procedure, the complainant will
be deemed to have made a binding election when either is concluded. In the Voutsis
case it was held that the adoption of a conciliation agreement proposed by the state
agency constituted the conclusion of the proceeding and an election which precluded
furtherance of the federal court proceeding.
290. See discussion p. 46 supra.
291. See pp. 44-45 supra.
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In 1970 OFCC and EEOC entered into a memorandum of under-
standing2 92 establishing certain experimental procedures designed to
reduce duplication of activities and to facilitate exchange of informa-
tion. Among the various measures, OFCC was to transmit to EEOC
all complaints filed under the Executive Order and EEOC was to in-
vestigate them as charges under Title VII. EEOC was to transmit its
decision as to probable cause and its findings to OFCC. In the case
of complaints against government contractors filed initially with EEOC,
that agency was likewise to notify OFCC of its decision and findings
in order that OFCC could inform the contractor of possible vulner-
ability under the Executive Order as well as under Title VII. 293 The
effectiveness of the memorandum was to be evaluated at the conclusion
of the first 90 days of operation. In the experience of the author some
regional offices of EEOC and some civil rights offices of the contracting
agencies are unaware of the memorandum.
C. OFCC v. State Agencies
If a company or union attorney is to advocate a preemption theory
for the Executive Order, it might deal with proceedings before state
and local civil rights bodies concerning matters regulated by the Execu-
tive Order. Title VII contains a disclaimer by Congress of any intent
to free employers from their obligations under state legislation. 294
There is no such disclaimer in the Executive Order. The grounds for
arguing exclusivity against state and local regulations are twofold.
The first contention is that the Executive Order and the implementing
regulations provide a complete and demanding system, which must
require all of the employer's and union's energies in the equal oppor-
tunity realm. The second is that the quotas and goals which are the
heart of the affirmative action require steps in conflict with the basic
ban of state and local legislation on discrimination in employment.
For the practitioner interested in marketing the first proposition, there
is some very mild inspiration in Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc.295
and Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.2 96 Each case held that the
292. Memorandum of Understanding issued jointly by OFCC and EEOC effective
May 20, 1970, 401 BNA FAIR EMPL. PRACTICE MANUAL 275.
293. This disclosure would seem to contravene the requirement of confidentially appli-
cable to EEOC investigative files, Title VII § 709(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1964).
294. Title VII § 708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964).
295. 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
296. 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964) (civil action for damages incurred as a result of alleged
violation of nondiscrimination provision in Executive Order).
Vol. 10: 1, 1971
National Labor Policy
complaint mechanism established by the Executive Order and by the
implementing regulations is the exclusive channel for the processing
of complaints that a government contractor or subcontractor has vio-
lated its commitments under the Executive Order. A federal district
court does not have jurisdiction of such a claimed violation. It must
be noted that a government contractor located in a state with a civil
rights statute is subject to both the prohibition on discrimination in
that statute and the covenant to refrain from discrimination in Para-
graph 1 of the Equal Opportunity Clause. If an aggrieved individual
claims a violation of the covenant in Paragraph 1, his only recourse,
according to the Farkas and Farmer decisions, is to the complaint
procedure in the Executive Order. If the grievant frames the com-
plaint as a violation of the state statute and omits any reference to
the Executive Order, the question arises as to whether this mere change
in form saves the complaint from the preemption ruling in Farkas
and Farmer.297
As to the second proposition, that the incompatibility of state stat-
utory requirements with affirmative action, necessitates a preemption,
there is some support in Eastern Contractors. In that case one of the
grounds of constitutional invalidity asserted by the plaintiffs was that
affirmative action requirements in the Philadelphia Plan conflicted
with the ban in the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act on the use
of quotas. 298 The Third Circuit also noted in its opinion that the Plan
required the recording of the race of applicants for employment and
of racial breakdowns in the work force itself. In the event of conflict,
the court held, the terms of the Executive Order must prevail. While
this holding does not give birth to a doctrine of preemption, it does
suggest an incapacity in the state tribunal to order action at variance
from the Executive Order. By footnote the Third Circuit interjected
that state courts might approve "benign quotas" as being within the
framework of the state legislation.299 In view of the growing infatua-
tion of state and local regulatory agencies for affirmative action, 00 this
297. In Farmer the Third Circuit recognized and deliberately declined to decide whether
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes a suit for discharge dam-
ages pursuant to a state anti-discrimination statute independent of the provisions of a
contract. 329 F.2d at 10. The court quoted the following from Colorado Anti-Discrimina-
tion Commission v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 725 (1963); "It is
impossible for us to believe that the Executive intended for its orders to regulate air
carrier discrimination among employees so persuasively as to preempt state legislation in-
tended to accomplish the same purpose."
298. See p. 28 supra.
299. 442 F.2d 159, 166 & n. 14 (3d Cir. 1971).
300. See pp. 46-47 supra.
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prophecy may well be accurate. As the state and local tribunals gravitate
towards the standards of affirmative action in their adjudications, the
areas of conflict with the Executive Order are narrowed, and the pos-
sibilities that a court in a future case will pronounce a preemption
doctrine are lessened.
XII. THE DEADLOCK AND A PROPOSAL
It is predicted that the national labor policy will remain vital and
husky, notwithstanding some loss of prestige to affirmative action. Con-
gress and the courts have made no significant moves to diminish the
realm of subjects within the purview of compulsory collective bargain-
ing or to weaken the tactical devices available to unions in winning
their collective bargaining demands. It is predicted that government
contractors and subcontractors who are confronted by conflicting de-
mands in the arenas of collective bargaining and of affirmative action
will normally bow to collective bargaining and take their chances on
affirmative action.
As a consequence there will not be a significant dislodging of the
labor contract provisions which have handicapped employers in ful-
filling affirmative action requirements. There are various standard con-
tract clauses which are depressing affirmative action. The most obvious
is seniority because of its regulation of promotions and transfers and
because, when layoffs occur, it causes the more recently hired employees
to go out the door first. When a minority worker recruited through
affirmative action enters a unionized institution, he typically must
begin at the bottom and await the long crawl upwards as he slowly
accumulates seniority. When economic conditions cause a reduction
in force, the more senior employees normally have the right to bump
the recently hired ones. One should also take account of that institution
called superseniority, which in the typical contract accords to the union
officers the kind of preferential treatment which some affirmative action
partisans would urge for minority hirees.
In the construction industry employers often blame collectively
bargained hiring hall clauses for their ineffectiveness in minority hiring
programs. Because of the disassociation of the employer from the intake
process, the employer has little influence on such factors as recruitment,
registration for work and referral.
There should be awareness of some other normal contract clauses
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which can, under some circumstances, impede affirmative action prog-
ress. In this analysis it should be kept in mind that hirees recruited
through affirmative action programs are often culturally disadvantaged
individuals in need of special counselling and surveillance. Sometimes
they are persons who need special acclimation to the work environment
and to the responsibilities of maintaining union membership.
A compulsory union membership clause can have a stultifying affect
because for some recruits the employer may not be able to promise
permanent or regular work. In this connection collectively bargained
clauses, which by express prohibition or by practical implication in-
hibit the employer in the use of part-time and casual workers, narrow
the opportunities to extend working experiences to the disadvantaged.
If the contract establishes a probationary period for new hirees, the
length or brevity of that period can affect the employer's capacity to
perform affirmative action undertakings. The preference of unions has
been to eliminate the probationary period altogether or to shorten it.
An employer is less likely to take a risk on an inexperienced individual
if the probationary period is too short for a full manifestation of work
potential.
Many contracts provide that on transfer from the bargaining unit
into a foreman's position or into any position outside the bargaining
unit an employee loses all accumulated seniority. Unless the employer
can guarantee permanent status in the new position, members of the
rank and file think long and hard before gambling on such a for-
feiture. Since management-level careers are part of affirmative action,
employers need the flexibility to try out minority members of the bar-
gaining unit in management jobs on an experimental or training basis.
If the nation is now prepared to set a first priority on affirmative
action, one can conceive of measures in both the public and private
sectors which would ease the destructive competition with the national
labor policy. The premise to the recommended measures is a common
commitment to the goals of affirmative action by Congress, the Execu-
tive, management and unions.
Initiatives of management-The astute employer should now recog-
nize that the issues debated at the bargaining table are interdependent
with programs emanating from the Executive Order. When evaluating
union proposals an employer should judge whether embodying certain
proposals in the contract would limit the employer's responsiveness to
affirmative action requirements. When the employer frames its own
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counterproposals, it should include items which, if approved by the
union, would increase the employer's effectiveness as an affirmative
action vehicle. The employer should take account of deficiencies pre-
viously cited during compliance reviews and anticipate new measures
which may become necessary or efficacious during the term of the col-
lective agreement. Even though bargaining table proposals may perish
in the face of union opposition, the effort should alert the union to
the employer's sense of responsibility in the affirmative action arena.
In addition, it should impress the responsible compliance officer as to
the employer's good faith in pursuing minority goals. 3 01 The employer's
initiatives are more likely to succeed if unions and the government
adopt certain initiatives discussed below.
Initiatives of unions-Although labor organizations are not the
direct targets of compliance reviews and sanctions, the sophisticated
union leader should recognize that policies which expose the employer
to debarment also expose the membership to unemployment. By re-
forms in hiring halls, seniority systems and other valued institutions,
unions can modernize them to withstand attacks by the civil rights
agencies. More importantly, if affirmative action is truly a new dynamic
of economic life, shouldn't unions capitalize on it as they have capital-
ized on the pension movement, on the national alarm for health and
safety and on training, testing and apprenticeship? Instead of shunning
the subject, a union can bring its own portfolio of affirmative action pro-
posals to the bargaining table.3 02 Again the success of union initiatives
would be dependent in large measure upon reform by management
and government.
Initiatives of the Executive-Agencies which interpret and adminis-
ter the Executive Order must open their eyes to the majesty and the
durability of the national labor policy. During the term of the labor
contract an employer simply cannot institute practices at variance from
it, and during negotiations a union's defense of entrenched clauses is
almost unshakeable. As a result it is believed that the Executive must
301. The August 1, 1971, Settlement Agreement between the United Steelworkers of
America and the Coordinating Committee Steel Committees includes an "Appendix Deal-
ing with Testing" (Appendix I), which by its terms evinces a sensitivity to the principle
of job-relatedness developed in regulations and adjudications dealing with minority rights.
302. In the 1968 steel negotiations the union demanded and won provision for a joint
Committee on Civil Rights to review matters involving civil rights. Agreement between
United States Steel Corporation and the United Steelworkers of America, August 1, 1968,
marginal paragraph 25.2.
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innovate inducements and penalties which impinge on unions as well as
on employers. Some suggestions follow:
(1) Including unions representing employees of government con-
tractors and subcontractors in the compliance network on the same
basis that coverage now envelops suppliers and subcontractors;
(2) Designing an equal opportunity clause applicable to unions to
be incorporated in (a) the collective bargaining agreement with the
government contractor or subcontractor and (b) in annual certifica-
tions by the union to the contractor;
(3) Establishing compliance reviews of unions subject to the Exec-
utive Order;
(4) Expanding the complaint procedure under Regulation 60-1 to
include complaints of bias by union members and employees against
unions;
(5) Providing for referrals by OFCC to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board as well as to the Department of Justice and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission of findings deleterious to unions;
(6) Developing a staff expertise concerning collective bargaining
and labor management relations;
(7) Introducing a proceeding to be initiated by either a government
contractor or a union for the purpose of obtaining a ruling by OFCC
as to whether an existing or proposed contract clause is detrimental to
the contractor's performance of affirmative action;
(8) Establishing a mechanism for observation of collective bargain-
ing sessions during which terms critical to affirmative action are under
consideration;
(9) Furnishing, on the request of either a government contractor
or its union, technical assistance in the form of model labor contract
clauses or staff assistance at the bargaining table.
Initiatives of Congress-Finally if Congress desires squarely to em-
brace affirmative action as a national priority it might consider the
following suggested amendments to the National Labor Relations Act:
(1) Adding definitive standards for nondiscriminatory hiring halls; 30 3
(2) Introducing a procedure for investigation and hearing of cita-
tions of non-compliance with the Executive Order referred by OFCC
to the National Labor Relations Board (in accordance with the new
303. Such an amendment would probably be an augmentation of § 8(f) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(o (1964).
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procedure for OFCC proposed as item (5) above applicable to the
Executive); 304
(3) Establishing a special decertification mechanism for unions cited
by employees in the representative unit for discriminatory practices or
cited by OFCC for non-compliance with the Executive Order;30 5
(4) Adding to enumerated unfair labor practices of unions and of
employers the act of bargaining to impasse to retain or gain a proposal
which OFCC has, after conclusion of the proceeding proposed in item
(7) applicable to the Executive, ruled to be detrimental to a govern-
ment contractor's performance of affirmative action;30 6
(5) Specifically excluding from the unfair labor practice of refusal
to bargain in good faith, a refusal to bargain on a proposal which
OFCC has ruled to be detrimental to a government contractor's per-
formance of affirmative action;807
(6) Establishing a procedure by which the Board can for a period
not , 120 days permit a gove.nme.., contractor to suspend a
provision of the collective bargaining agreement in order to effectuate
a recommendation of OFCC or of the responsible contracting agency
for which a short-term departure from the agreement is necessary.
Inherent in the foregoing proposals is a call for a debate in Congress,
where the issues would require a full hearing. In the present artificial
situation OFCC and the contracting agencies try to influence unions
by compliance efforts against employers, unions try to preserve and
expand their protective systems through bargaining table pressures
against employers, and the courts try to repel attacks against affirma-
tive action by presupposing a Congressional intent to harmonize the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the Executive Order. If an adventure-
some Congressman were to sponsor some or all of the suggested amend-
ments to the National Labor Relations Act, the major issues would be
debated by the interested parties. Unions would be forced to justify
the perpetuation of the national labor policy in the face of the coun-
try's affirmative action needs. Supporters of the Executive Order, of
the Philadelphia Plan, and of similar programs would be required to
convince Congress of their proposed national priorities. Finally, those
304. This amendment would probably require an additional subsection to § 10 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
305. See Independent Metal Workers Union, Locals 1 and 2, Hughes Tool Co., 147
NLRB 1573 (1964).
306. This amendment would affect §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1964).
307. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1964).
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who contend that the spirit of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 can countenance color-conscious hirings and color-conscious pro-
motions would be exposed to a strenuous philosophical interchange
with the proponents of an unbiased system. If the confrontations would
result in amendments to the Executive Order and to the National La-
bor Relations Act as proposed above, affirmative action would then
truly have a chance.
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